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THE HEALTH CARE DECISIONS ACT OF 1993 
John Carroll Byrnest 
On May 11, 1993, Maryland's Governor, William Donald Schae-
fer, signed into law the Health Care Decision Act l (HCDA), one of 
the most comprehensive health care decision laws in the nation. In 
doing so he set free a bird that some fear may be a predator at 
times, but that all of its many authors expect will be a dove of peace 
for individuals who while on a painful thre~hold of death, have not 
yet crossed it. 2 
t Judge of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City and chairman of the legislative 
drafting committee of the Conference of Circuit Judges committee formed to 
propose life support decision standards for judges in guardianship cases. Judge 
Byrnes served as an adjunct faculty member of the University of Baltimore 
School of Law from 1988-92, and as an adjunct faculty member of the Univ-
ersity's Yale Gordon College of Liberal Arts since 1990. He has also served as 
an adjunct faculty member of Loyola College since 1986. 
The author expresses sincere appreciation to Jack Schwartz for his preview of 
this Article, his helpful editing and comments, and his assurance that its tone is 
"generous and even." Very helpful reviews by Senators Walter M. Baker and 
John A. Pica, Delegate Stephen J. Braun, Hon. Rosalie S. Abrams, Dr. Louis 
C. Breschi and Dr. George A. Taler, and Howard L. Sollins, Esq. are greatly 
appreciated as well. Opinions expressed in this Article are those of the author. 
1. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-601 to 618 (1994). This Act took effect on 
October I, 1993. By 1992, every state had authorized some form of life-sustaining 
treatment decision making, although the source, scope, and circumstances of the 
authority varies. Alaska law, for example, did not permit agents to make life 
support decisions. Twenty-seven states had no law clearly permitting family-
surrogate decisions in the absence of advance declarations. The District of 
Columbia and 20 states did have such laws; and three states, including Maryland, 
had either court or attorney general opinions recognizing surrogate decisions. 
Right-to-Die Case & Statutory Citations State-by-State Listing, CHOICE IN DYING 
(Choice in Dying, formerly Concern for Dying and the Society for the Right to 
Die, 200 Varick St., New York, N.Y. 1(014), Dec. 1990 (on file with author). 
2. Death is defined in the Maryland Code as either the irreversible cessation of 
circulatory and respiratory functions, or the cessation of "all functions of the 
entire brain, including the brain stem." MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-202 
(1994). 
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My experience with this field of law began in 1986 with In re 
Cole. 3 This case came to my courtroom in Baltimore City's Court-
house East almost exactly six years before the Governor's approval 
of the health care decision bill. I later described it: 
On May 9, 1986, I was approached in the courthouse 
hallway by a well regarded young lawyer who was frequently 
court appointed in routine guardianship proceedings for the 
disabled. He mentioned a pending request for an order 
permitting withdrawal of a life support system. The hearing 
was scheduled in a few hours. I asked if research had been 
done. Apparently, this inquiry was unexpected because the 
pending requested order seemed indistinguishable from the 
nearly pro forma non-controversial guardianship proceed-
ings that routinely appear on our civil "fast track" docket. 
At the hearing several hours later, I was informed that 
the subject of the proceeding was comatose following a 
stroke 41 days earlier. This order was sought by her hus-
band, a respected minister, with the support of all of their 
children, none of whom were present. 
The husband was represented by another young attorney 
who candidly acknowledged that the matter was outside his 
professional experience. The attending physician testified 
that the patient's chances of recovery were between one in 
one thousand to one in one billion; and that there had been 
no formal hospital ethics committee review. 
The husband testified that he was told that his wife, as 
she suffered the stroke, in the presence of several of their 
children, declared that she "didn't want to live like this," 
and this statement was consistent with comments made 
during previous family discussions on the plight of another 
member of her family. As noted, none of the children who 
actually heard this declaration were present to testify. 
While persuaded that the bereaved husband was sincere 
and caring in his petition, I was perplexed that such a grave 
request was being made with such legal and medical casu-
alness. To the apparent surprise and chagrin of the petitioner 
husband and counsel, I declined to sign the order. Six days 
later, the patient regained full consciousness and, rather 
quickly thereafter, virtually all her faculties. 4 
3. In re Cole, No. 8611053/CE 49265 (Cir. Ct. Balt. City May 19, 1986) (Byrnes, 
J.). 
4. John Carroll Byrnes, A "Macro" View of the Law of Life Support Withdrawal, 
3:3 THE BARRISTER 9 (1990). The story of this case has been published. HARRy 
A. COLE & MARTHA M. JABWW, ONE IN A MILLION (1990). One of the children 
expressed strong disagreement with the requested order, but this apparent dissent 
was not made known to me at the hearing. Id. at 220. 
1993] The Health Care Decisions Act 3 
I was intrigued by the rather simple approach taken in Cole, as 
compared to the case of Karen Ann Quinlan ten years earlier in New 
Jersey, where the issue was "given much greater legal and medical 
attention.s These two cases were similar, however, in the lack of 
clear governing law and procedural standards.6 Also present in both 
5. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied sub nom., Garger v. New 
Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
6. Before the decision in Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188, 618 A.2d 744 (1993), 
Maryland had little common law on the subject of health care decision making. 
In ~ddition to Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977), which adopted 
the informed consent doctrine (a physician must have the knowing consent of 
the patient in order to treat) in Maryland, there were only a handful of related 
decisions. See Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hosp., 293 Md. 685, 703, 447 A.2d 
1244, 1253 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1147 (1983) (holding that the clear and 
convincing standard applies to proof of facts justifying sterilization of an 
incompetent ward at the request of his guardian); Levitsky v. Levitsky, 231 Md. 
388, 190 A.2d 621 (1963) (holding that the religious beliefs of a mother, a 
Jehovah's Witness, could not overcome the state's interest in the welfare of her 
child, and blood transfusions were properly ordered); Craig v. State, 220 Md. 
590, 155 A.2d 684 (1959) (recognizing a statutory duty of parents to provide 
reasonable medical treatment to minor children even when such treatment is 
antithetical to the religious beliefs of the parents); Mercy Hosp., v. Jackson, 62 
Md .. App. 409, 489 A.2d 1130 (1985), vacated, 306 Md. 556, 510 A.2d 562 
(1986) (concluding that a circuit court judge properly declined to appoint for a 
competent, conscious, rational, adult hospital patient who required a Caesarean· 
delivery, but refused on religious grounds to consent to a blood transfusion, 
putting only the mother, not the fetus, at risk); Snyder v. Holy Cross Hosp., 
30 Md. App. 317, 327, 352 A.2d 334, 339, cert. denied, 276 Md. 750 (1976) 
(finding the state's interest in peace, health, and good order was sufficiently 
compelling to override the religious objections of the father, an Orthodox Jew, 
who did not want his son's body autopsied). After Cole, the appeal in In re 
Riddlemoser, 317 Md. 496, 564 A.2d 812 (1989), was dismissed as moot, but 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland commented, in dicta, that the "withdrawal 
of respiratory life-support or a gastric feeding tube is the termination of already 
existing medical treatment." Id. at 504 n.5, 564 A.2d at 816 n.5. Study has also 
been done at the Maryland Circuit Court level. See In re Sahm, No. 92-T-0043, 
Mar. 30, 1992, Cir. Ct. for Bait. Co. (J. Jacobson); In re Mack, No. 91-T-103, 
Mar. 10, 1992, Cir. Ct. for Bait. Co. (J. Fader). See generally John Carroll 
Byrnes, A "Macro" View of the Law of Life Support Withdrawal, 3:3 THE 
BARRISTER 9 (1990); John Carroll Byrnes, Life Support Withdrawal: Law of 
Commiseration or Principle, 2:2 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 333 (1991). 
Prior to the enactment of the HCDA, Maryland had only the living will. 
See Maryland Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN .• 
§§ 5-601 to 614 (1990) (repealed 1993). Two Maryland attorney general opinions 
have interpreted MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§ 13-601 to -603 (1990), to 
include the authority for a durable power of attorney for health care decisions. 
See 75 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. (Op. No. 90-044) (Sept. 24, 1990); 73 Op. Att'y 
Gen. Md. 162 (1988). The 1988 opinion also correctly anticipated some federal 
constitutional protection of other means of health care self-determination. See 
73 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. 162 (1988). 
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cases was an instinctive and sincere belief on the part of counsel and 
the parties that the relief sought was necessary and appropriate to 
the needs, wishes, and best interests of the afflicted patient. 
This experience made obvious the need for standards to protect 
life needlessly threatened by the benevolent or malevolent intentions 
of others. Also needed are appropriate means by which every person 
can express his or her own health care wishes in a legally convincing 
manner, as well as means for lawful involvement by family members 
in life-ending health care decisions. Ideally, these goals should be 
met without crossing the border into mercy killing and euthanasia, 
and without re-engagement of the pro-choice and anti-abortion an-
tagonists and antagonisms.7 
While it is fair to say that these goals were addressed with the 
adoption of the HCDA, only experience with the law will determine 
whether these goals are met. It is my intention to present this new 
law by explanation of its essential purposes, history, detailed provi-
sions, and public policy expectations. 
I. THE NEED FOR A UNIFORM STANDARD OF HEALTH 
CARE DECISION MAKING 
The typical health care decision has been made either directly 
by the patient and the physician, or if the patient was unable to 
intelligently communicate a decision, by family members and the 
physician. Other than in distinct informed consent situations, such 
as by a parent for a minor child, or in emergencies,s it has not been 
7. The philosophical and political similarities between the issues of abortion and 
euthanasia are superbly presented by Ronald Dworkin. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE's 
DOMINION, AN ARGUMENT ABoUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDNIDUAL FREE-
DOM (1993). Professor Dworkin argues that all reasonable people both reject 
government control of a citizen's medical choices and respect life, whether their 
rationale derives from religious, cultural, or legal traditions, or from personal 
humanitarian ethics. He suggests that the political debate should center on finding 
the reasonable balance between personal freedom to control what happens to 
one's own body, and community protection of life qua life. Although this writer 
and others involved in the drafting of proposed health care decision legislation 
had neither a pro-life nor a pro-choice agenda, the abortion issue had a marginal 
influence on the final design of the Bill. For example, the legislative sponsors 
deleted language referring to the traditional state interest in the preservation of 
life in favor of less provocative language of the same import. 
8. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-107 (1990) provides physician and surrogate 
authority for emergency health care decisions. The seminal Maryland informed 
consent decision, Sard, 281 Md. at 432, 379 A.2d at 1014, arguably was confined 
to circumstances where some significant invasion of the body was contemplated. 
"The fountainhead of the doctrine of informed consent is the patient's right to 
exercise control over his own body, at least when undergoing elective surgery, 
by deciding for himself whether or not to submit to the particular therapy." [d. 
at 439, 379 A.2d at 1019. It is notable that Sard was decided in 1977, see id., 
the year following Quinlan, see 355 A.2d at 647. 
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entirely clear who was authorized as a matter of law-as opposed to 
practice-to make what decisions and when. This was particularly 
true when the decision involved placement or removal of a life 
support mechanism from an incompetent patient. The 1976 New 
Jersey decision in In re Quinlan9 and the 1990 decision of the United 
States Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department 
of Health 10 focused the decisional authority in the life support context 
more sharply on the patient. 11 Both decisions gave an older common-
law doctrine of informed consent greater reach,12 and Cruzan rec-
ognized every individual's constitutional liberty interest in controlling 
his own health care. 13 Quinlan and several influential state decisions 
also proposed a solution to the dilemma presented by the comatose 
or otherwise incompetent patient who could not express any deci-
sion. 14 The solution was to permit substituted judgments by surrogate 
decision makers, such as close family members and friends.l s In 
9. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied sub nom., Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 
922 (1976). 
10. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
II. See id. at 261; Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 647. 
12. The recent Maryland life support decision in Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188, 618 
A.2d 744 (1993), rested upon common law, not constitutional law. [d. at 210-
12, 618 A.2d at 755-56. 
13. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote: 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall "deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." The 
principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from 
our· prior decisions .... But determining that a person has a "liberty 
interest" under the Due Process Clause does not end the inquiry; 
"whether respondent's constitutional rights have been violated must be 
determined by balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state 
interests. " 
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278-79. 
Decisions such as Union Pacific Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891), 
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914), and in 
Maryland, Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977), established 
informed consent principles, but did not expressly anticipate the application of 
those principles to a comatose patient for whom the question was not whether 
to perform some surgical procedure for therapeutic purposes, but rather whether 
to not perform a procedure, or to remove some therapeutic or life-sustaining 
device from a patient incapable of giving informed consent. 
14. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 284-85. 
15. The doctrine of substitute judgment originated more than 150 years ago as a 
means of administering the estate of an incompetent person. See Superintendent 
of Belchertown St,,\te Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431 (Mass. 1977) (citing 
Ex parte Whitbread in re Hinde, a Lunatic, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (1816» (gift from 
the incompetent's estate was given to another person to whom the incompetent 
owed no duty of support). Basically, this doctrine permits the court to substitute 
itself for the incompetent by "don[ning his] mental mantle" and acting as the 
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addition to the substituted judgment doctrine, many states, including 
Maryland,16 also enacted what came to be known as living will laws. 
These laws provided that a person could state in a formal document 
that when they were in a terminal condition and their death was 
imminent, they did not wish their "dying [to be] artificially pro-
longed" by life-sustaining procedures,l1 
As this personal autonomy law evolved, it. did so simultaneously 
with, and partially driven by, a growing public interest in avoiding 
what was perceived to be an undignified and unnecessarily prolonged 
dying process. The process was often accompanied, if not sometimes 
partially caused, by artificial means of life support that replaced 
inoperative vital bodily functions,1s As these artificial devices came 
incompetent would have acted. In re Carson, 241 N.Y.S.2d 288, 289 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1962). The doctrine of substituted judgment made its national debut on the 
life support stage in the Quinlan decision. See Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 647. In 
Maryland, it has been the lynch pin of the emergency treatment law, see MD. 
CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-107 (1990) (enacted 1982). In Cruzan, Justice 
O'Connor made clear in her concurring opinion "that the Court does not today 
decide the issue whether a State must also give effect to the decisions of a 
surrogate deCision maker." Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 289; see also Mack v. Mack, 
329 Md. 188, 204 n.4, 618 A.2d 744, 752 n.4 (1993). 
16. See supra note 6. 
17. In Maryland, this declaration would not apply if the patient were pregnant and 
required the administration of medicine, food and water, and care required for 
comfort and pain relief. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605 (1994 & Supp. 
1994). Such declarations are referred to as "advance directives." Id. § 5-601(b). 
The incorporation into this law, 1985 Md. Laws 620, of the pregnancy exception 
and that law's political gestation period of 12 years, Mack, 329 Md. at 212, 618 
A.2d at 756, presaged the same conflict eight years later in the 1993 Session 
when, again, the politics of abortion mingled with that of broader health care 
autonomy. In the end, it was agreed that abortion rights will be determined by 
national law and MD. CODE ANN., HEAL~-GEN. § 20-103 (1990 & Supp. 1994), 
and therefore it was important to steer this ship away from those shoals. 
18. These included various feeding tubes, respirators, and other resuscitative tech-
nology. For a full discussion of the various types of feeding tubes, see Mack, 
329 Md. at 192-93 n.l, 618 A.2d at 7~7 n.1. 
One historian has written that "[n)inety percent of the medicine being 
practiced today did not exist in 1950," John Steele Gordon, How America's 
Health Care Fell III, AM. HERITAGE, May/June 1992, at 49, and that life 
expectancy in this country increased 44070, to 68.2 years, between 1900 and 1950, 
id. at 52. Approximately 1400 to 1800 physicians used a variety of resuscitative 
methods including bellows ventilation, barrel maneuvers, and mouth-to-mouth. 
Arlo S. Hermreck, The History oj Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation, 156 AM. J. 
SURGERY at 430 (1988). The mouth-to-mouth method was discouraged because 
of the potential for oral disease transmission, but was given renewed credence 
by scientific studies in the 1950s. Id. at 431. In this same decade, iron lung 
machines were introduced for Poliomyelitis victims. Gordon L. Snider, Thirty 
Years oj Mechanical Ventilation: Changing Implications, 143 ARCHIVES OF 
INTERNAL MED. at 745 (1983). In 1960, successful use of closed-chest cardiac 
massage and defibrillation led to portable defibrillators used in combination with 
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into sometimes indiscriminate use, many physicians agreed that ag-
gressive treatment was often superfluous and burdensome to dying 
patients. 19 The dilemma of physicians was poetically captured in a 
commentary by David Schiedermayer, M.D., discussing his elderly 
patient, Cardinal Jackson, whose medical problems included demen-
tia, Alzheimer's disease, colon cancer, pneumonia, and multiple 
urinary tract and other infections. Dr. Schiedermayer described the 
dilemma as follows: 
When I lecture in the Ethics Class, the medical students 
ask me why I keep treating her. Why not just stop treating, 
they ask. 
Why not? Six years of knowing her. A dozen life-
threatening infections. Already a no-code, already no-ICU. 
That's why not. I asked [her] daughter five times to stop 
tube feeding, shocked her each time, and she said definitely 
no each time. That's why not. 
A socioeconomic history of discrimination and mistreat-
ment. A tradition of poor health care and nontreatment. 
The need to show her somehow we're not abandoning her. 
That's why not. Because her daughter's a nurse, because 
her daughter loves her and thinks it's best to keep doing 
things just as we are. That's why not. And because I can't 
stand to think of the fire dying in those green eyes. 
closed-chest massage. Hermreck, supra, at 434. In the 1960s, respirators, or 
positive pressure ventilators, came into use. Snider, supra, at 746. The positive 
pressure ventilator requires either an endotracheal tube or a tracheostomy tube. 
Id. In the late 1960s, intravenous nutrition came into wide use for patients who 
could not tolerate feedings by mouth or by gastrostomy tubes. MAURICE E. SHILS 
& VERNON R. YOUNG, MODERN NUTRITION IN HEALTH AND DISEASE 1023 (7th 
ed. 1988). Parenteral nutrition now includes fats, sugars, and protein through 
indwelling venous catheters. Id. at 1026. In the 1970s, shock trauma and intensive 
care facilities were inaugurated using, among other life support methodologies, 
mechanical ventilators, renal dialysis, and parenteral nutrition. Snider, supra, at 
746. 
19. The New York Times reported a recent survey of physicians wherein 70070 of 
them reported "acting against their conscience in overtreating terminally ill 
patients." Jane F. Brady, Doctors Admit Ignoring Dying Patients' Wishes, N.Y. 
TIMEs, Jan. 14, 1993, at A18. In Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., No. 
A891087, (Ct. Common Pl~, Hamilton Co., Ohio), an 82 year old plaintiff 
alleged that, against his express instruction, a hospital used electric shock to 
revive him from a heart attack. The plaintiff alleged that two days later he 
suffered a very debilitating stroke that damaged him financially and emotionally 
as well as physically; he sought damages for wrongful living. Id.; see also David 
Margolick, Patient's Lawsuit Says Saving Life Ruined It, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 18, 
1990, at AI. 
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But why not just let her die, they ask. 
I try, but I really can't explain. It just doesn't make 
sense to them. Their parents probably have living wills. 
They just don't understand yet, but they will understand 
when they have a Cardinal of their own. 
Dying, you want dying, I guess I should say to them. 
I know how to stop treatment and let dying happen. I have 
stood by the bedsides of plenty of patients. I have seen 
long, slow dying. I have witnessed the leaving, the parting, 
the closing. 
So then, I should ask the students, so then are we 
children of the sun or of the earth? If the students will 
answer this question, then I will tell them why I don't just 
let Cardinal Jackson die. 
What is it that gives a person dignity? What is that 
inner grace that projects out toward the doctor, so that he, 
despite his intellect and education and training and skills, 
is taken aback? Whatever it is, Cardinal has it . . . . It 
manifests itself as inner ability, as a palpable sense of self. 
The dignified are above reproach. You can't take dignity 
away from the dignified. They wear it lightly.20 
The tragic ambiguity of the lives of Karen Ann Quinlan and 
Nancy Cruzan accentuated but did not fully define the breadth of 
these concerns. Left in the wake of this evolution in health care 
decision making were many unanswered questions: Where was the 
dividing line between the individual's health care autonomy and the 
physician's professional discretion? Who can be a "surrogate," and 
what is the extent of their authority and by what standards should 
they decide? Can an advance directive anticipate medical syndromes 
other than imminent death such as the comatose condition and the 
final, or even early stages of serious, inevitably fatal diseases such 
as AIDS and Alzheimer's Disease? Can an advance directive designate 
someone else to make some or all health care decisions, and if so, 
who can be designated, and when and to what extent can their 
authority be effective?21 How, if at all, was emergency medical 
20. David Schiedermayer, The Case: House Calls To Cardinal Jackson, 17 SECOND 
OPINION 35, 38-39 (1992). 
21. In 1988, the Attorney General of Maryland sanctioned family decision making 
to a limited extent, resting his decision on a solid but unmortared foundation 
of common, case, and statutory law. See 73 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. 162, 192-201 
(1988). The HCDA subsequently supplied the mortar. 
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treatment authority affected by the enhancement of patient control? 
By what standards should guardians, often complete strangers to the 
disabled ward, and their appointing judges make potentially life-
ending decisions?22 Because so many health care decisions will be 
made on behalf of patients lacking the mental competence to decide 
for themselves, how will such vulnerable patients be protected from 
thoughtless and harmful decisions they would not make themselves? 
The HCDA is intended to answer these questions. 
II. THE HISTORY OF THE HCDA 
The seed of the HCDA was hybrid. It included strains of the 
heightened public attitude regarding the importance of self control 
over the dying process,23 recognition of dramatic improvements in 
22. 1990 Md. Laws 709, sponsored by Senator Julian L. Lapides amended the 
guardianship provisions of MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § 13-708(b), (c) 
(1991), to permit judges to authorize guardians to decide whether to terminate 
or withhold life support, but the law did not provide any standards for those 
decisions. 
23. In 1991, the citizens of the State of Washington defeated Initiative 119, which 
would have legalized euthanasia-permitting a physician to kill terminally ill 
patients who ask'to die. N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1991, at B16. The vote (991170 of 
precincts) was 701,440 (54%) opposed and 606,039 (46%) in favor. Id. A similar 
proposal the following year in California, Initiative 161, was defeated although 
over 4.5 million voters supported it. Virginia Ellis & Paul Jacob, California 
Elections, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1992, at A3. A 1986 American Medical Association 
poll reported nearly three of four Americans, 73% of the 1,510 survey respon-
dents, favored "withdrawing life support systems, including food and water, 
from hopelessly ill or irreversibly comatose patients if they or their family request 
it." George P. Smith, All's Well that Ends Well: Toward a Policy oj Assisted 
Rational Suicide or Merely Enlightened Self-Determination, 22 V.c. DAVIS L. 
REv. 275, 367 n.656 (1989). Fifteen percent were opposed and 12% were unsure. 
Id. Seventy-five percent of those younger than 65 years and 640/0 of those older 
than 65 favored it. Id. Of 509 lawyers responding to a Gallup telephone poll 
for the ABA Journal, 56.8% stated that administering a lethal injection to a 
terminally ill patient who wants to die and has made clear this wish, should be 
legally recognized. Id. Approximately 89% opposed active euthanasia if the 
patient's consent is ambiguous. Id. 
Similar polls present the same popular opinion. For example, a national poll ' 
by the Boston Globe and the Harvard School of Public Health in 1991 showed 
that 64% of the respondents favored some form of legalized euthanasia. RONALD 
DWORKIN, LIFE's DOMINION, AN ARGUMENT ABoUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND 
INDTVIDUAL FREEDOM 181 (1993). A 1994 random poll by Sidney Hollander found 
that nearly three out of four Marylanders polled favored assisted suicide. Frank 
P.L. Somerville, Poll Indicates Support jor Assisted Suicide, THE SUN (Balt.), 
Feb. 21, 1994, at 1 B. The problem is that such polls may reflect only what the 
respondents believe might be good public policy as applied to others. There is 
no reliable poll known to this author that asks the respondents what they would 
want done for themselves and extrapolation here may be unjustified. Maybe the 
most reliable poll of that nature is the rather modest actual usage of advance 
declarations. 
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life-sustaining and restorative medical technology, and the constitu-
tional and common law informed consent principles enunciated in 
Quinlan and Cruzan.24 
The roots of the HCDA are multiple. Perhaps the earliest 
legislative roots were established by the work of interested state 
legislators,2S all of whom sponsored bills in previous sessions of 
Maryland's General Assembly to authorize advance directives such 
as the living will26 and durable power of attorney. 27 1990 Maryland 
Laws 709, sponsored by Senator Lapides at the request of the Chief 
Judge of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, Robert C. Murphy, 
expressly authorized judges to permit guardians to consent to life 
support withdrawal and withholding, but provided no standards for 
such decisions. This left state circuit judges in the same quandary as 
before.28 To rectify this, Judge Hovey G.R. Johnson of the Circuit 
Court for Prince George's County proposed to the Maryland Con-
ference of Circuit Judges29 that a committee be formed to propose 
guidelines or standards for the implementation of this new guard-
ianship authority. That committee was formed in late 199po and it 
24. See su[1ra notes 11-13 and accompanying text. 
25. These legislators included Senators Vernon L. Boozer, Michael J. Collins, Julian 
L. Lapides, and Paula C. Hollinger; and Delegates Sheila E. Hixson, Leonard 
H. Teitelbaum, and Peter G. Callas. 
26. Life Sustaining Procedures Act, MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605 (1990) 
(repealed 1993). 
27. S.B. 377, 1992 Sess. (Md. 1992). This Bill was proposed by Senators Hollinger 
and Boozer, but was not approved by the General Assembly. It would have 
authorized a person to execute a durable power of attorney for health care and 
to appoint an agent to· make health care decisions. /d. It was criticized for its 
lack of precision and standards. 
From 1988 through 1993 the Health Law Section of the Maryland State Bar 
Association, under the capable leadership of Robert J. Ryan, Jack C. Tranter, 
Robert G. Brewer, Jr., Howard L. Sollins, and N. Lark Schulze, strongly 
advocated both a durable power of attorney law and related changes in the 
Maryland Rules. 
28. Many judges believed their equitable and plenary powers gave them such authority 
without specific legislation, particularly in light of such decisions as Quinlan and 
similar influential holdings in other states. Other judges believed that without 
some clear expression from the legislature, the Supreme Court, or the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland, they lacked that authority. 
This was the view of Baltimore City Circuit Court Judge Thomas Ward in 
his decision that led to the appeal in In re Riddlemoser, 317 Md. 496, 564 A.2d 
812 (1989). "At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Ward declined to issue the 
[do not resuscitate] order. He stated that whether the relief sought by the 
guardians should be granted was 'not properly before this court,' thereby 
indicating his belief that he lacked the authority to issue the order." Id. at 501, 
564 A.2d at 814-15. Subsequent legislative amendments at least clarified the basic 
authority of Maryland's circuit judges. 
29. This organization was established by Maryland Rule 1207 and consists of the 
eight Circuit Administrative Judges and additional representative judges elected 
from each circuit by the judges of that circuit. 
30. Its members included, in addition to Judge Johnson as chair, Catherine Bouchard 
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appointed a smaller committee to actually draft those standards.31 
Another very influential part of this root system were two 
opinions of Attorney General J. Joseph Curran, Jr. The opinions 
recognized a constitutional and common-law right to patient self-
determination as well as an expanded range of advance directives 
and, in limited circumstances, surrogate decision making beyond that 
already authorized for emergency treatment. 32 These opinions pro-
vided important and needed guidance pending legislative action. 
Roots were also growing within the local academic community, 
notably in the well regarded Law and Health Program at the Uni-
versity of Maryland School of Law.33 Academicians, ethicists, and 
physicians grappled with the real life and death problems presented 
by the growing conflict between the traditional healing role of the 
physician and the contemporary demands made upon them for what 
many regarded as excessive or useless treatment. Physicians were 
sometimes motivated both by the need to practice defensive medicine 
(Office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County), Dr. Louis 
C. Breschi (Chairman, Committee on Professional Ethics, Medical and Chirurg-
ical Faculty of Maryland), Judge James C. Cawood, Jr. (Circuit Court for Anne 
Arundel County), Judge John F. Fader, II (Circuit Court for Baltimore County), 
Dr. Timothy J. Keay (Department of Family Medicine, University of Maryland), 
Walter McQuie, Esq. (Maryland Disability Law Center), Dr. George A. Taler 
(University of Maryland School of Medicine and Chair, Long Term Care 
Committee, Medical and Chirurgical Faculty of Maryland) and this writer. Report 
of the Bill Drafting Committee to the Maryland General Assembly and to the 
Conference of Circuit Judges, May 5, 1993. 
31. The drafting committee included this writer as chairman, Walter McQuie, Esq., 
of the Maryland Disability Law Center, and Dr. George A. Taler of the University 
of Maryland Hospital. It was later expanded to include Jack Schwartz, Chief 
Counsel, Opinions and Advice, Office of the Attorney General, who had drafted 
the two comprehensive opinions of the Attorney General on this subject, and 
health law practitioner Howard L. Sollins, Esq., who chaired the Health Law 
Section of the Maryland State Bar Association. It was hoped that Diane E. 
Hoffmann, Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Maryland School of 
Law, could also join this drafting group, but she could not, initially because of 
scheduling conflicts and later because of differences as to approach. She made 
excellent contributions to the work of the group in any event and ultimately 
became a chief drafter of an alternative bill, the Westminster proposal. 
32. See 75 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. No. 90-044 (Sept. 24, 1990); 73 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. 
162 (1988). The first was written before the Cruzan decision and the second after 
it. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). A 
significant post-Cruzan conclusion was that the Cruzan decision recognized a 
constitutional liberty interest in health care self-determination rather than, as 
anticipated in the 1988 decision, a privacy right. [d. at 278-80. 
33. This program is chaired by Professor of Law Karen H. Rothenberg and, among 
other activities, it uses an interdisciplinary approach to emerging medical, health 
policy, and law related issues. Assistant Professor of Law Diane E. Hoffmann 
serves on that faculty and was a chief drafter of the health care decision bill 
sponsored by Senator Hollinger. 
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to forestall malpractice claims as well as to strictly adhere to the 
spirit, if not the letter, of the Hippocratic Oath.34 
The ethical-intellectual-medical interest in the problem was, of 
course, national and international in scope. A more subjective, 
patient-centered approach to the problems of the dying has been 
proposed. 3s The Hastings Center, The Right to Die Society (now 
34. The classic formulation of the Oath emphasizes that doctors should do no harm. 
In reaction to the dramatic changes in medical practice and perceptions of the 
good of patients, a significant number of medical schools have modified or 
abandoned the Oath, some in favor of this "Prayer of Maimonides," recom-
mended by the World Medical Association in 1948: 
Thy eternal providence has appointed me to watch over the life and 
health of Thy creatures. May the love for my art actuate me at all 
times; may neither avarice nor miserliness, nor thirst for glory, or for 
a great reputation engage my mind; for the enemies of truth and 
philanthropy could easily deceive me and make me forgetful of my 
lofty aim of doing good to Thy children. May I never see in the patient 
anything but a fellow creature in pain .... 
Hippocratic Oath, AM. MED. NEWS (1971). 
35. The Hemlock Society, the name derived from an ancient means of suicide, has 
also attracted interest. It defines itself as a society supporting active voluntary 
euthanasia for the terminally ill and has attracted some notoriety for its self-
deliverance suggestions. DEREK HUMPHRY, LET ME DIE BEFORE I WAKE (1981). 
In California, suicide workshops are conducted for the public. CBS Evening 
News: Suicide Workshops (CBS television broadcast, Mar. 3, 1993). A new 
organization, Compassion in Dying, advocates humane death by suicide with the 
assistance of medical volunteers. N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1993, at 32. A strong 
proponent of physician-assisted suicide is Dr. Jack Kevorkian of Michigan who 
on August 4, 1993, assisted his 17th patient in "a merciful suicide," explaining, 
."1 will always do so when a patient needs it, because I'm a physician." THE 
SUN (Balt.), Aug. 5, 1993, at 8A. His patient, suffering from Lou Gehrig's 
disease, a degenerative nerve disorder, died after inhaling carbon monoxide. Id.; 
see also Nancy Gibbs, Rx for Death, TIME, May 31, 1993, at 34. 
Attorney General Curran has issued a formal opinion that assisted suicide 
is probably a common-law crime in Maryland and that any uncertainty should 
be resolved by a statute that clearly prohibits it. 78 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. No. 
93-036 (Sept. 8, 1993). A bill introduced in the 1994 session of the General 
Assembly prohibiting assisted suicide was not enacted. S.B. 343, 1994 Sess. 
(Md. 1994). There is a reasonable basis for limited disagreement with the 
Attorney General's opinion if one concludes that the General Assembly pre-
empted the health care decision field by enacting the HCDA with its explicit 
language that "[n)othing in this subtitle may be construed to condone, au-
thorize, or approve mercy killing or euthanasia, or to permit any affirmative 
or deliberate act or omission to end life other than to permit the natural 
process of dying." MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-611(c) (1994). Once a 
person becomes a patient within the umbrage of health care decision making, 
a decision not expressly permitted by the HCDA, e.g., the provision of excessive 
medication with the knowledge that the patient wishes it suicidally and not for 
symptom relief, has no lawful sanction. Assisted suicide in a medical treatment 
context is likely to be as violative of the HCDA as would be a surrogate 
decision made in bad faith, or a hospital's decision to ignore a clear advance 
directive in order to maintain room occupancy. Additionally, the Attorney 
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known as Choice In Dying), and the American Society of Law, 
Medicine, and Ethics are among those asking not only what the 
traditional medical response is to a given affliction, but also whether 
that response is what the patient wants-or if that is not known, 
whether it is in the patient's best interest. In other words, if either 
by patient wish or by the acceptable judgment of someone else, 
preferably a close family member or friend, the routine medical 
response would unduly prolong the dying process and outweigh the 
presumed benefit, that medical response should be withheld or with-
drawn.36 
Although the developing academic and ethical consensus was 
that it is not always appropriate to maximize the techno-medical 
response to every severely distressed patient, there remains serious 
ethical and political uncertainty about the extent to which the au-
thority for these decisions should be placed in the hands of persons· 
other than the patient. This is especially true when there is no evidence 
of the patient's wishes, and the decision rests upon someone else's 
perception of the patient's best interestY 
General's cogent discussion of why assisted suicide is probably a common-law 
crime in Maryland is persuasive. 78 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. No. 93-036 (Sept. 8, 
1993). 
36. See PEG CAMERON, HANDBOOK OF LIVING WILL LAWS (1984); HASTINGS CENTER, 
GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT AND CARE OF 
THE DYING (1987); Harvard Ad Hoc Standards, A Definition oj Irreversible 
Coma, 205 JAMA 337, 339 (1968); DEREK HUMPHRY, LET ME DIE BEFORE I 
WAKE (1981); Pius XII, Anaesthesia: Three Moral Questions, THE POPE SPEAKS, 
Summer 1957, at 48; Deciding To Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment, THE PRES-
IDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND 
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 185 (1983); Sidney H. Wanzer & Daniel 
D. Federman, The Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly III Patients, 320 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 844, 848 (1989). 
37. Judge Rodowsky, writing for the majority in Mack, stated the concern this way: 
A best interest argument in the subject context presents a complete shift 
in the substantive legal justification for a court's action. Best interest 
is not based on the patient's right of self-determination as to whether 
treatment should be received or rejected, because the absence of any 
conclusion as to the patient's judgment on that issue is precedent to 
applying the best interest analysis. 
Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188, 218, 618 A.2d 744, 759 (1993). The court then 
stated that '" [t]he problem with the best-interests test is that it lets another make 
a determination of a patient's quality of life, thereby undermining the foundation 
of self-determination and inviolability of the person upon which the right to 
refuse treatment stands.'" Id. (quoting In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 
292, 299 (III. 1989». An example of the difficulty here may be seen in this 
excerpt from the amicus brief of the Attorney General in Mack: "The only 
existence [Mr. Mack] has is as the 'subject of bodily intrusions that . . . [from 
an observer's point of view] are humiliating and undignified.'" Mack, 329 Md. 
at 217, 618 A.2d at 759 (citing Rep. Br. App. at 6). In other words, there is 
danger in shifting the perspective from the patient to an observer of the patient. 
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In 1948, Dr. Leo Alexander, who had studied German Nazi 
medical practices for the post-World War II Nuremberg war crimes 
tribunals, published an early warning38 that a public policy of per-
mitting someone other than the patient to decide that the' patient 
deserves a good death is inevitably a form of euthanasia.39 He was 
concerned that American medical practice was on the threshold of 
subtly accepting an early, pre-Holocaust, Nazi medical principle of 
lebensunwerten leben-life unworthy of life.40 There was also some 
One can reasonably ask how an unconscious person can experience humiliation 
or lack of dignity. One answer that was considered by the Conference Committee 
was the reasonable man test, i.e., would a reasonable man or woman in that 
circumstance perceive himself or herself as humiliated or lacking dignity? This 
approach was rejected as too subjective and lacking a patient self-determination 
focus. Cf. Sanford H. Kadish, Letting People Die: Legal and Moral Reflections, 
80 CAL. L. REV. 857 (1992); Thomas W. Mayo, Constitutionalizing the Right 
To Die, 49 MD. L. REv. 103 (1990); S.G. Pollack, Life and Death Decisions: 
Who Makes Them and by What Siandards?, 41 RUTGERS L. REv. 505 (1989); 
Philip J. Prygoski, Abortion and the Right To Die: Judicial Imposition of a 
Theory of Life, 23 SETON HALL L. REv. 67 (1992); Karen H. Rothenberg, 
Forgoing Life-Sustaining Treatment: What Are the Legal Limits in an Aging 
Society?, 33 ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 575 (1989). 
38. See Leo Alexander, Medical Science Under Dictatorship, 241 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
39 (1949) (cited in Mack, 329 Md. at 221-22 n.ll, 618 A.2d at 761 n.ll). 
39. The term euthanasia has two references. The first, active euthanasia, involves 
action intended to give a person a good death. ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE 
62-63 (1989). The second, passive euthanasia, involves action intended to allow 
a person a good death. Id. at 63-64. The HCDA expressly excludes euthanasia 
from its reach. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN § 5-611(C) (1994). It is arguable 
that, despite the express language of the HCDA, permitting a decision to not 
act to sustain life or to act by removal of life support is at least passive 
euthanasia. The conflict can be resolved by focusing on the purposes of the 
HCDA. Nowhere in the legislation did the General Assembly express a desire to 
facilitate good deaths. Rather, the sole focus is on permitting a citizen to control 
his or her own medical course and stating how that might be done when the 
patient is incapable of personally deciding, all within the context of the state's 
life-respecting ethic. Obviously, there is a hint of sophistry here because the 
intent of a humanitarian decision maker to afford the patient a good death will 
frequently, even if impermissibly from a literalist's point of view, creep into the 
process. Nevertheless, the distinction is important in order to keep the attention 
of the decision maker where it belongs-on the patient's preferences' as they 
might be honored pursuant to this law. Further, a personal request of a patient 
for an action or inaction that a reasonable person would understand to be a 
request for euthanasia or assisted suicide will, at the very least, bump up against 
the euthanasia wall, if it cannot reasonably be seen as intended only "to permit 
the natural process of dying." MEISEL, supra, at 62-63. 
40. The Nazis applied this at first to the mentally ill; and it is worth noting that 
dementia may be considered a form of mental illness and is also a prominent 
characteristic of Alzheimer's Disease. The concern many have is that if the 
HCDA permits dementia to be a reference point for life support decisions, why 
not paranoia or schizophrenia? Holocaust references are overblown in a history 
of the HCDA because the development of the law, in contrast to that of 
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concern that recognizing absolute autonomy on the part of a patient, 
who might be in an undiagnosed transitory despondency or nonclin-
ical depression, may permit medical suicide and confer a corollary 
right to insist upon the active collaboration of the medical professions 
in a desire to die. These concerns also became part of the HCDA 
root system. 
Another root consisted of the strong desire on the part of 
powerful constituent organizations, such as the American Association 
of Retired Persons (AARP),41 for flexible advance directive forms to 
which the elderly, in particular, could have easy access. The existing 
living will statutory form was considered inadequate by the AARP 
and many others because its utility was restricted to those who had 
executed it in advance, with a degree of formality similar to the 
traditional last will and testament, and whose death from a terminal 
illness was imminent.42 It was reasonably argued that by enacting the 
living will law in 1985 the General Assembly stated the outer bound-
ari~s of advance directives in Maryland, and that those boundaries 
did not encompass: oral advance directives; surrogate decisions; 
appointments of agents to make health care decisions; or the possi-
bility of a more comprehensive advance directive that anticipated 
Germany in the 1930s, was very patient-centered and it now requires health care 
decisions which give scrupulous attention to the wishes, values, and medical 
circumstances of the patient. Also, our state interests have a common denominator 
of life protection, whereas the state's interests during the Nazi era were presum-
ably advanced by applying the lebensunwerten leben medical-political ethic. 
41. This organization was actively and effectively represented throughout the drafting 
process by Gerard F.B. Miller and the late Martin Milrod. They sought to 
minimize restrictions on decision making and the publication of a model form 
declaration, among other objectives. At the national level, AARP joined the 
ACLU in the latter's opposition to a Michigan anti-Kevorkian law. Physician 
assisted suicides have been tolerated in the Netherlands for two decades and 
recently have been given legal approbation so long as there is patient consent. 
"Yet a 1991 study found that in one year more than 1,000 Dutch patients who 
were not capable of giving consent died at their doctors' hands." Nancy Gibbs, 
Rx jor Death, TIME, May 31, 1993, at 35, 38. For the results of a comprehensive 
study of this Dutch medical practice, see Paul J. Van der Maas et al., Euthanasia 
and Other Medical Decisions Concerning the End oj Life, 338 THE LANCET 669 
(1991). This study reported that "[l]ife termination by administering legal drugs 
without an explicit and persistent request from the patient ... happens in about 
0.80/0 of all deaths," but that in a majority of these cases the decision had been 
discussed "in a previous phase" of the illness. [d. 
42. For good discussions of the problematic state of pre-HCDA advance declaration 
law, see Diane Hoffmann, Planning jor Medical Decision Making: Living Wills 
and Durable Powers oj Attorney, 38 MD. MED. J. at 154 (1989); Wendy 
Kronmiller, Comment, A Necessary Compromise: The Right to Forego Artificial 
Nutrition and Hydration Under Maryland's Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, 47 
MD. L. REv. 1188, 1206-07 (1988); Howard L. Sollins, Advance Medical Direc-
tives, 24 MD. B.J. 7, 7-8 (1991). 
o 
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other medical conditions,including the persistent vegetative or co-
matose state and conditions of severe deterioration that fall short of 
terminal illness and imminent death. Additionally, the living will law 
required the provision of food and water and precluded its imple-
mentation if the patient was pregnant.43 
In an effort to nurture these roots and to consider whether a 
responsible plant could be brought to full flower with a minimum 
of philosophically acrimonious weeding and pruning, three interested 
individuals representing different perspectives met in the winter of 
1991-92 on an ad hoc basis to fashion a balanced statement of 
principles that might guide future growth in this area of the law in 
Maryland.44 Several informal meetings of this group brought sub-
stantial consensus on various principles that persisted throughout the 
subsequent drafting process. First, individual decision making would 
be strengthened, including the authority of family-surrogate decision 
making. Second, the persistent vegetative state would be included as 
a condition that might justify consideration of discontinuing life 
sustaining treatment. Third, the state interests would not be inde-
pendent standards but would be implicit in particular protective 
provisions, including appropriate definitions of critical concepts. 
43. Law of July I, 1985, Ch. 620, § 5-605(2), 1985 Md. Laws 2944, 2950 (repealed 
1993). There is a more conservative perspective, quite different from that rep-
resented by the HCDA, of which the reader should be aware. According to this 
perspective, it is arguable that the traditional living will is all that is required if 
the concern is that people, when terminally ill, will be kept lingering on the 
threshold of death at a point in time when it is only the machines that sustain 
them. If a patient executes one in advance or upon admission to a chronic care 
facility, he would receive normal nourishment to avoid the discomfort of dehy-
dration and starvation as well as pain medication to minimize whatever pain is 
associated with his illness. However, no extraordinary intervention, such as 
resuscitation to interrupt the normal dying process, would be permitted. The 
very different dilemma of the patient in a persistent vegetative state could be 
resolved by legislation that addressed it forthrightly and exclusively. The "end-
stage condition" would be addressed by patients exercising their common-law 
informed consent rights and simply informing the physician of their wishes in 
advance of the end-stage phase. This is particularly apt for those afflicted with 
diseases such as Alzheimer's and AIDS which are marked by progressive and 
predictable deterioration. Sadly, they often have significant advance warning of 
what is to come. Family decision making, where there are caring families, would 
continue, de facto in collaboration with physicians. In the absence of caring 
family members, guardianship is available. According to this conservative view, 
it will eventually become normal for patients to advise their health care providers 
about which medical procedures should be used in various circumstances based 
on their medical prognosis; thereby making health care agents unnecessary. In 
other words, if it is the public intent to honor patient self-determination, this 
more limited public policy is all that would be required, not the HCDA. 
44. This trio consisted of Jack Schwartz, Chief Counsel for Opinions and Advice, 
Office of the Attorney General; Diane E. Hoffmann, Assistant Professor of 
Law, University of Maryland School of Law; a respected health law scholar; 
and this writer. 
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Finally, the standards for agent, surrogate, and guardian decisions 
would be consistent throughout the law. The standards would require 
that the first consideration be what the patient wanted, and if that 
was unknown, the best interest of the patient could be considered. 
These discussions ultimately provided a basis for a bill filed in the 
waning days of the 1992 session of the General Assembly. 45 A revised 
version of this Bill was later endorsed by the Conference of Circuit 
Judges Committee for its drafting committee (hereafter Conference 
Committee) as a working document.46 This draft was then the focus 
of many Conference Committee drafting meetings throughout 1992. 
In order to solicit the views of interested individuals and organ-
izations on a direct basis, the Conference Committee supported a 
public meeting to be convened by the Attorney General and the Law 
and Health Program of the University of Maryland School of Law 
on November 18, 1992. That large meeting, held at Westminster Hall 
in Baltimore, was successful in exposing deficiencies in the draft then 
in circulation.47 A deficiency from one perspective was that it severely 
compromised the role of the state interests in legislation that had as 
its purpose shifting medical decisIon responsibility in many instances 
to agents,' guardians, and family members, not all of whom would 
be completely dependable in giving the welfare and wishes of the 
patient first priority. From another perspective came the criticism 
that there was too much restriction on decision making, which in 
some aspects might adversely affect women in particular. 48 Rather 
45. S.B. 745, 1992 Sess. (Md. 1992). This Bill was sponsored by Senator John A. 
Pica, who later. sponsored Senate Bill 676, the Conference Committee Bill in 
1993. Senator Pica managed the compromise Bill on the Senate floor. 
46. Although the principal task of the Conference Committee was to develop 
standards for guardianships, in the 1992 session there was some disagreement 
over a durable power of attorney bill, S.B. 377, 1992 Sess. (Md. 1992), sought 
by state bar leaders and sponsored by Senator Paula C. Hollinger and Senator 
F. Vernon Boozer because it, like the guardianship amendments enacted in the 
1990 Session, lacked standards. An alternative durable power bill was sponsored 
by Senator Michael J. Collins. This conflict and the judges' related interest in 
guardianship standards prompted the chairman of the Senate Judicial Proceedings 
Committee, Senator Walter M. Baker, to agree with this writer that a compre-
hensive approach to health care decision making was needed. The Conference 
of Circuit Judges Committee thereafter enlarged its scope and began work on a 
comprehensive approach that would include individual, agent, surrogate, and 
guardian decisions. 
47. Hereafter, the thinking and drafting proposals of several of the participants in 
that meeting (including S.B. 664, 1993 Sess. (Md. 1993), the 1993 legislation 
sponsored by Senator Hollinger and co-sponsored by Senators Boozer and 
Boergers will be referred to as the work of the "Westminster Committee." There 
is no intent to suggest that this Committee represented a single viewpoint of the 
Westminster meeting attendees. 
48. This was in part a response to the earlier referenced state interest in the 
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than limit decision making because of the possibility of abuse of 
vulnerable patients, some Westminster attendees49 argued that there 
should be a presumption of trustworthiness.so There was also criticism 
that the language of that draft lacked sufficient clarity to be user 
friendly. There was' strong interest in a law that could be read and 
easily understood by nonlawyers and included a broad advance 
directive form in addition to, or instead of, the living will. Finally, 
there was criticism of the process of the Conference Committee.SI 
"preservation of life," which to some was reminiscent of the recently ended 
acrimonious debate in the 1992 General Assembly and the subsequent public 
referendum of the abortion statute. William Thompson, Abortion Foes Taking 
Steps to Fight Back, Opponents of New Law Plan to Take Issue to Referendum, 
THE EVENING SUN (Balt.), Feb. 19, 1991, at AI. In fact this state interest, which 
had no intended reference to abortion and has been routinely referenced in this 
genre of law, was self evidently implicated in any law governing life-sustaining 
medical treatment and was explicitly endorsed in the majority opinion of Justice 
Blackmun in Roe v. Wade: 
We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy includes the 
abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be 
considered against important state interests in regulation ... '. [T]he 
right . . . is not absolute and is subject to some limitations; and that 
at some point the state interests as to protection of health, medical 
standards, and prenatal life, becomes dominant. . 
410 U.S. 113, 154-55 (1973). In 1990 the Court decided Cruzan v. Director, 
Missouri Department of Health, which also expressly acknowledged this state 
interest in the preservation of human life. 497 U.S. 261, 280-81 (1990). In 
addition.to the abortion question, there was also concern that another traditional 
state interest, protection of dependent minors, would impact disproportionately 
on women. 
49. There was, as of yet, no Westminster Committee. 
50. At the Westminster meeting, Professor Rothenberg included among her criticisms 
of the draft of the Conference Committee that the "proposal also ignores reality 
... individuals do not live in isolation, but within complex and caring relation-
ships." The Conference Committee consisted of a judge experienced in guardi-
anships, an assistant attorney general thoroughly familiar with the implications 
of health care law, an active health care law practitioner, a family medicine 
practitioner, and an attorney with a particular interest in the disabled. Addition-
ally, others were consulted on this point and there was no disagreement that the 
reality is that unfortunately many individuals do not enjoy such relationships. 
Nurses voiced their concern to the Conference Committee about the dangers of 
concentrating excessive authority in family surrogates or agents and counting on 
informed, reliable advance directives at the moment of decision. How to offer 
adequate protection in the other cases without unduly restraining personal, agent, 
guardian, and family decision making caused continuing disagreement among the 
various drafting groups. In the end, the General Assembly opted for the protec-
tionist school supported by the Conference Committee. 
51. This criticism was fueled somewhat by the perception that the Conference 
Committee was closed to certain viewpoints and had only males as members. In 
response, it can be said that the drafting committee did not expect to be all 
male and went to great lengths to solicit and include a feminist perspective. 
Ultimately, the Committee was closed to the idea of absolute autonomy and 
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The Westminster criticism was fair and not all unexpected. It 
had always been anticipated that there would be some interested 
commentators who would see the presence of a restraint on choice 
in dying as a limitation on personal autonomy politically akin to 
restraints on abortion. Furthermore, there were those who felt such 
a restraint was contrary to the ideals of contemporary health care 
decision making and the Constitution. 52 The Conference Committee 
drafters were devoted to balance however, perhaps anticipating the 
eloquent discussion of this philosophical conflict by Professor Ronald 
Dworkin:53 
It is obviously important to think about who should make 
life-or-death decisions, with what safeguards and formal 
requirements, and whether and how the decisions, once 
made, should be reviewed by others. But it is also important 
unrestrained decision making by persons other than the patient. The Committee 
was also closed to the idea of excluding any opinion solely because it had a 
religious source as well as the notion that any single philosophy should prevail. 
The Conference Committee, in more than a dozen meetings in 1992 and 1993, 
including meetings exclusively for critics, . considered hundreds of ideas and 
amendments. That an idea did not receive the support of the Committee did not 
mean the Committee was closed to it. As with any detailed drafting project, in 
order to avoid a horse becoming a camel, it is inevitable that the writing reverts 
to a precious few, as the Westminster Committee itself learned. The Conference 
Committee outreach to so many consultants, the public meeting. at Westminster 
Hall, the continuous and amicable negotiations with the Westminster Committee, 
and the lengthy Senate and House of Delegates hearings accorded full and 
productive vent to every viewpoint. The balanced approach of the Conference 
Committee was fully vindicated by the decisions of the General Assembly that 
eventually adopted the substantive recommendations of the Conference Commit-
tee Bill in the format of the Westminster Committee Bill, adding from the latter 
bill "end-stage" and the emergency medical technician language, all as modified 
by the House subcommittee, under the able leadership of Delegate Stephen J. 
Braun. 
52. As noted in Mack, several state appellate and federal district courts had recognized 
a constitutional right of privacy as applicable to personal health care decisions 
during the 14 years between Quinlan and Cruzan. See Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 
188, 210-11, 618 A.2d 744, 755. Had that view prevailed, this argument would 
have significantly greater value. However, the Supreme Court in Cruzan recog-
nized only the lesser constitutional liberty interest in health care autonomy and 
thus gave some latitude to the states to enact laws that reasonably control the 
exercise of this right: "[W]e think that a State may properly decline to make 
judgments about the 'quality' of life that a particular individual may enjoy, and 
simply assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of human life to be 
weighed against the constitutionally protected interests of the individual." Cruzan 
v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282. 
53. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE's DoMINION, AN ARGUMENT ABoUT ABORTION, EUTHA-
NASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993). 
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to think about an even more fundamental matter: which 
decision is the right one to make, no matter who makes 
it. 54 
Much of the Westminster criticism found its mark, and the 
Conference Committee thereafter produced a significantly changed 
draft. 55 But the legislative clock was ticking; the General Assembly 
was to convene shortly. It was generally agreed that everyone should 
continue to cooperate and resolve differences so as to avoid the risk 
inherent in presenting a volatile concept to the General Assembly 
that lacked consensus. Consensus did continue regarding the primary 
issues and the basic decisional formula recommended by the Confer-
ence Committee.56 
54. [d. at 182. Professor Dworkin, also writes: 
[d. 
That paramount question is sometimes thought to lie in the exclu-
sive province of religion. But it must also be asked by people who are 
not religious, or by those whose religion gives no answer they believe 
suited to the contemporary world. It is also a political question, 
moreover. We cannot think intelligently about the legal and political 
issues-about who should make what choices, what constitutions should 
permit, and what nations and states should do-unless we have a better 
shared understanding, not necessarily about the meaning of death but 
at least what kind of question we are asking. How should we think 
about when and how to die? 
55. Jack Schwartz was the principal and very skilled author of all of the Conference 
Committee drafts. Schwartz and the Conference Committee believed that the one 
objective everyone shared-to keep health care decisions in the family and out 
of the court-was best attained through precise language that anticipated inter-
pretation problems. For example, the Conference Committee draft differentiated 
the roles and standards of health care agents, family members, physicians, and 
guardians, and preserved the living will, but also authorized a more general 
advance directive and stated limitations and standards for various kinds of 
decisions with some precision. This approach necessarily caused a lengthy and, 
to a layperson perhaps, ostensibly obtuse text. The subsequent November 1992 
Conference Committee draft was improved in general clarity; it responded to the 
criticism that the tone of the earlier draft was one of health care decision 
restriction rather than liberation. The earlier drafts were focused on life support 
denial, but the focus had since widened to include all health care decisions. 
Accordingly the tone was altered to give greater emphasis to the freedom of 
individual choice. However, the careful delineation of roles and standards, the 
continuation of the living will, and the expression of the state interests remained . 
. 56. As noted, the primary issues for which there was consensus included: individual 
autonomy, surrogate-family decisions, advance directives that permitted appoint-
ment of health care agents and wide health care choices, and finally, guardianship, 
health care agent, and surrogate standards that required decisions to reflect what 
the patient either said he or she wanted under the circumstances or the substituted 
judgment of the surrogate, agent, or guardian of what the patient would want 
in light of previous statements and other evidence, or as a last resort, a 
determination of the patient's best interest. 
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Nevertheless, differences persisted and as the start of the legis-
lative session became imminent an alternative draft was developed 
by an ad hoc committee of several participants in the Westminster 
conference (hereafter Westminster Committee) for introduction by 
Senator Paula HollingerY This alternative draft was intended to 
present to the legislature the remaining differences on important 
secondary issues. Although the Conference Committee preferred an-
other method of presenting those differences, Senator Hollinger's 
57. This Bill was modeled on the Virginia Natural Death Act, VA. CODE ANN., §§ 
2981 et seq. (1991 & Supp. 1993), which was seen as simpler in format and 
structure and generally less restrictive as compared to the Conference Committee 
Bill. It was drawn by an ad hoc committee coordinated by Assistant Professor 
of Law Diane Hoffmann with the assistance of various individuals, including: 
Leslie Fried, Joan O'Sullivan, and Eileen Franch of The Legal Aid Bureau, 
Gerald Miller and Martin Milrod of the Maryland Chapter of AARP, David 
Davis of the Maryland Chapter of Emergency Medical Physicians, and Baltimore 
County Circuit Court Judge John F. Fader, II. This drafting group conferred 
with some of the same consultants as the Conference Committee, but apparently 
did not include those with whom they disagreed, such as the Maryland Catholic 
Conference. The consequence of this was that the original Westminster Bill was 
considered seriously imbalanced on these secondary issues and perhaps only 
ostensibly "user friendly" in that its comparative brevity and apparent simplicity 
necessarily produced some ambiguity and a greater likelihood of litigation. See 
78 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. No. 93-019 (June 1, 1993); see also Howard L. Sollins, 
MICPEL, Legal Issues Arising from the Maryland Health Care Decision Act 
Chapter 372 of the Laws of Maryland, 1993, June 18, 1993. The Conference 
Committee Bill, S.B. 676, 1993 Sess. (Md. 1993), was sponsored by Senator 
Pica, chair of the related subcommittee of the Judicial Proceedings Committee. 
Its companion in the House of Delegates, H.B. 1243, 1993 Sess. (Md. 1993), 
was sponsored by Delegate Sheila E. Hixson, a long time advocate of change in 
this area of the law. Both of these principal Conference Committee Bill sponsors 
deleted from the drafts, before formal introduction, the following recommen-
dations of the Conference Committee: (1) codification of the state interests as a 
"Statement of Legislative Policy;" (2) the phrase "preservation of life" in the 
preamble; (3) mandated separate decision making for removal of tubes for food 
and fluids; (4) exclusion of comatose patients from a "best interest" decision to 
terminate life support; (5) limitation on agent and surrogate decisions concerning 
a pregnant patient; and (6) a controversial provision that would have required a 
court to consider any adverse effect on a minor dependent should a sole provider 
parent wish to forego life sustaining treatment that would be medically useful. 
This last proposal was perceived as an undue burden on women. In fact, it was, 
at least from that perspective anyway, a lessening of a potential burden on 
women in the context of existing law. In any event, the existing common and 
statutory law strongly empower the state to protect children from a parental 
decision which might prove harmful to them. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW 
§§ 5-502, 5-702, 5-1002 (1991); see also Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hosp., 
293 Md. 685, 699-702, 447 A.2d 1244, 1251-53 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 
1147 (1983). It was deleted for this reason and because of the high unlikelihood 
that the suggested provision would ever need implementation. 
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Bill,S8 and later its approximate companion Bill by Delegate Teitel-
baum,s9 (hereafter the Westminster Committee Bill) served the pur-
pose well. Through the weeks between the Westminster meeting and 
the actual introduction of the Bills, and thereafter, discussions con-
tinued to resolve tertiary differences and the two approaches became 
more similar.60 Both the Conference Committee Bill and the West-
minster Committee Bill agreed on the following primary legislative 
objectives: (1) recognize individual health care control, or "auton-
omy"; (2) permit family or close friend surrogate decisions by 
substituted judgment; (3) allow decisions to be made on a best interest 
basis if the individual was not able to make the decision and a 
substituted judgment was not possible; (4) authorize advance direc-
tives which give wide discretion to citizens to anticipate future therapy 
choices including the provision of artificially supplied nutrients and 
fluids and those that might accompany the persistent vegetative state; 
and (5) permit the appointment of a health care agent who could 
make whatever decisions the principal wished. 
The sixth objective, providing judicial standards in guardianship 
cases, was met fully in the Conference Committee Bill, and uncer-
tainly in the Westminster Committee Bill. A seventh common pri-
mary objective was to assure some degree of protection to vulnerable 
patients whose lives might be seen by the less scrupulous as leben-
sunwerten leben. Because there was no serious disagreement with 
these primary recommendations of the Conference Committee, both 
Bills contained similar recommendations. 61 
Despite the similarities, significant differences remained concern-
ing important secondary issues.62 First, and perhaps foremost, the 
58. S.B. 664, 1993 Sess. (Md. 1993). 
59. H.B. 1432, 1993 Sess. (Md. 1993). 
60. As the Conference Committee chairman, I had earlier decided that as the 
legislative sessiori drew closer, leadership of its effort would be assumed by Jack 
Schwartz. He did a superior job in continuing the dialogue, achieving agreements 
and, assisted by Conference Committee staff counsel Alan Deanehan, Esq., and 
in close collaboration with representatives of the Westminster Committee, in-
cluding Professor Hoffmann and Leslie Fried, Esq., shepherding the blended 
legislation through both houses. I remained, however, in daily contact with 
legislative activity and decisions. 
61. Diane Hoffman, J.D., the principal author of the Westminster Bill, testified to 
this effect before the Judicial Proceedings Committee on February 23, 1993: 
"[I]t is my view that SB 664 [Westminster Committee] does about 95070 of what 
SB 676 [Conference Committee] does plus a few things that SB 676 doesn't do 
... in about half the space." Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee Hearing 
on Health Care Decision Making Bills, Feb. 23, 1993. The fact that the Bills 
substantially mirrored one another was obscured by a Sun editorial written in 
mid-session which gave an impression of competing bills. Decisions About Death, 
THE SUN (Balt.), Mar. 26, 1993, at 16A. A post-session editorial commented 
favorably on the compromises that produced the final enacted version. Context 
jor LIfe or Death Decisions, THE SUN (Balt.), Apr. 18, 1993, at 2C. 
62. There can be endless debate about what is primary and what is secondary. The 
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Westminster proposal vested virtually unguarded authority in surro-
gates to make life ending decisions without clear standards. The term 
"best interest" was only loosely defined. This was particularly im-
portant because good faith decision makers would be immunized. 
Additionally, the inclusion by the Westminster Committee of what 
came to be termed the "end-stage condition," a medical status which 
is somewhere short of imminent death, during which surrogates might 
order the cessation of life-sustaining therapies was another differ-
ence.63 Without standards, there was a clear danger of life-ending 
decisions being made for economic reasons64 or upon the surrogate's 
only mandate of Cruzan was to recognize patient self-determination. See Cruzan 
v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-87 (1990). Writing on 
that nearly blank slate, the primary decisions concerned the extent to which 
others would be allowed to decide for the patient. Once those decisions are made 
they lead to secondary questions of degree and limits, and to tertiary questions 
about procedures and formalities. From another less structural perspective, 
decisions such as the recognition of end-stage are primary. See MD. CODE ANN., 
HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601(i) (1994 & Supp. 1994). 
63. The end-stage condition evolved from a condition earlier considered by the 
Conference Committee, at the urging of the Alzheimer's Association, which we 
had originally termed the "inevitably fatal" condition. It was ultimately not 
adopted by the Conference Committee because it was so vague. The Conference 
Committee did nOl oppose the concept per se, but rather urged its presentation 
in a separate bill so that it could have proper medical, ethical, and public 
scrutiny. Although the HCDA does not confine end-stage to Alzheimer's disease, 
a disease which eventually leaves its victims incapable of caring for themselves, 
much of the attention was paid to that syndrome. 
There is a consensus among physicians that most cases of suspected Al-
zheimer's cannot be diagnosed with certainty other than by a post mortem 
autopsy, although it is estimated that "the correlation between premorbid and 
autopsy findings are probably in the range of 95%." Letter from George A. 
Taler, M.D. to John Carroll Byrnes (Oct. 4, 1993) (on me with author). The 
Alzheimer's Association describes the disease this way: 
The most common form of dementing illness, Alzheimer's Disease (AD), 
is a progressive, degenerative disease that attacks the brain, causing 
impaired memory, thinking and behavior. The person with AD may 
experience confusion, personality and behavior changes, impaired judg-
ment, and difficulty finding words, finishing thoughts or following 
directions. It eventually leaves its victims incapable of caring for them-
selves. 
Alzheimer's Association Statement oj Purposes (1993). A Harvard Medical School 
study in 1989 estimated that 11.30/0 of the American population 65 years of age 
or older probably had Alzheimer's. Of· those age 75 to 84, 16.4% had Alzhei-
mer's; and 47.55% of those over 85. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE's DoMINION, AN 
ARGUMENT ABoUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 219 (1993). 
64. The Attorney General's representative testified before the legislature that he was 
familiar with anecdotal evidence that in many cases if therapy was financed by 
insurance or public subsidy the surrogate decision was likely to favor its use. 
However, in situations where the estate of the patient would be depleted by the 
medical expense, the decision was against the therapy. Jack Schwartz, Assistant 
Attorney General, on behalf of J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of 
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subjective evaluation of the patient's quality of life. This difference 
of opinion was highlighted by the debate over the language of the 
preamble which the Conference Committee successfully supported: 
WHEREAS, The balance struck by this Act reflects the 
preeminent societal value that the life of every individual 
has worth in and of itself and is not to be devalued by 
reason of an individual's incapacity or perceived diminished 
"quality of life," whether because of emotional, mental, or 
physical disability, or because of age or economic disadvan-
tage .... 65 
The General Assembly adopted the recommendations of the Confer-
ence Committee and amended the Westminster Committee Bill to 
include the disputed preamble language, as well as clear patient 
oriented standards for surrogate decisions, which contained a more 
complete definition of "best interest." 
Another serious difference concerned the nature of the advance 
directive model form to be presented in the statute. Although both 
Bills agreed upon the right of a person to designate a health care 
agent and to devise his or her own advance directive, the Westminster 
Committee Bill repealed the existing living will law entirely. The 
Conference Committee Bill retained the existing living will law as a 
conservative option for citizens and provided for a post session public 
process by which a broader model advance directive alternative could 
be developed.66 These differences were resolved by retaining the living 
Maryland, Testimony in Support of Senate Bill 676, Before the Senate Judicial 
Proceedings (Feb. 22, 1993) (on file with author). The Conference Committee 
had taken an unequivocal position against decisions motivated by economics, 
although recognizing that a surrogate's, health care agent's, or guardian'S decision 
should reflect the patient's wish that expense be taken into account. See REPORT 
OF THE Bn.L DRAFTING COMMITTEE TO THE MARYLAND GENERAL ASSEMBLY, May 
5, 1993, at 17 n.l1. 
65. Law of May 11, 1993, Ch. 372, Preamble, 1993 Md. Laws 2007, 2009 (quoted 
language not enacted). 
66. See Edmund D. Pellegrino, M.D., Ethics, 268 JAMA 354 (1992). Professor 
Pellegrino offers an incisive critique of advance directives in light of the federal 
Patient Self-Determination Act. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, 
1990:4206, 4751. Pub. L. 101-508. He concludes: 
[p]roperly used advance directives can be of significant help to patients, 
families, and physicians in treatment decisions when patients become 
incompetent. Improperly used, they can become instruments not of 
patient preferences but of economic purpose, family bias, or physician's 
values. The moral uncertainties inherent in the operation of the new 
law underscore the physician's fiduciary responsibility for a morally 
nuanced implementation. The physician's obligation is to safeguard the 
patient against an overzealous legalism that could defeat the intent of 
the law itself. 
Pellegrino, supra, at 355 (it should be noted that the Patient Self-Determination 
Act requires only that patients be advised of their options according to the laws 
of their particular state, not that every patient must have an advanced directive). 
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will as one of two proposed model forms and inserting a second 
model form which included the option of appointing a health care 
agentY 
The sensitive matter of tube feeding, the provision of nutrients 
and fluids through a tube, was the subject of further disagreement. 
For example, the family of the comatose Karen Quinlan wanted 
removal of a respirator, but not of feeding tubes. 68 Although the 
respirator was removed, Miss Quinlan lived for many years.69 In 
contrast, the family of Nancy Cruzan sought removal of the feeding 
tubes.70 To make the issue more stark, it has been suggested that it 
may be appropriate to note dehydration as at least a secondary cause 
of death when feeding tubes are removed from a patient. 71 The 
emotional dimension notwithstanding, many courts, including the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland in Mack v. Mack, have concluded 
that there is no legally significant difference between tube feeding 
and other life-sustaining means, and have sanctioned their removal. 72 
The Westminster Committee Bill proposed only that its model ad-
vance directive give individuals the choice of continuing or declining 
feeding tubes. The Conference Committee also regarded tube feeding 
as another means of life support subject to removal. However, in 
addition to presenting this option in a revised living will, the Con-
ference Committee recommended that discrete feeding tube decisions 
be made by health care agents, surrogates, and guardians. Compro-
67. This compromise was the suggestion of the Director of the Office on Aging, 
Rosalie S. Abrams, who, with the encouragement of Governor William Donald 
Schaefer, played an active and constructive role throughout the legislative process. 
68. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 659 (N.J.), cert. denied sub nom., Gerger v. New 
Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
69. See, e.g., Victor Cohen, The Patient's Advocate - The Right to Die: How Courts 
Have Ruled, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 1988, at Z8. 
70. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 267 (1990). 
71. In re Johnson, No. 922190551CE 152410 (Cir. Ct. Balt. City 1993) (Byrnes, J.) 
(testimony of neurologist Dr. Tippett); Personal Communication with Louis C. 
Breschi, M.D., Chairman of the Ethics Committee of the Medical and Chirurgical 
Faculty of Maryland (July 27, 1993). In the event food and fluids are not made 
available to a patient, it is obviously difficult to determine whether death resulted 
from the disease or trauma that was the initial focus of the chronic care or from 
dehydration and starvation. The distinction is easier in the case of a terminally 
ill person than one in a persistent vegetative state or end-stage condition. 
72. In Mack, Judge Rodowsky wrote that "[a)bsent a statutory exclusion of artifi-
cially administered sustenance from the medical treatment or procedure referred 
to in MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-708 (Supp. 1994), artificially 
administered sustenance is included in those terms." Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 
188, 214, 618 A.2d 744, 755 (1993). Since the Mack decision interpreted then-
existing statutory language governing guardianships, an implication of Judge 
Rodowsky's language is that the legislature could, if it chose, impose different 
standards on the withdrawal.or withholding of such care. 
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mise produced model advance directives that distinguish tube feeding 
from other modes of life support and specific language that empha-
sizes that distinct judgments can be made regarding nourishment by 
tubes in the absence of an advance directive to the contrary. 73 
There was a difference between the Bills' treatment of guard-
ianship standards as well. The Westminster Committee Bill had 
virtually none, apparently assuming the guardian would act in the 
capacity of a surrogate.74 On the other hand, the Conference Com-
mittee proposed guardianship standards for the Estates and Trusts 
Article of the Maryland Code. These standards were independent of, 
but nevertheless consistent with, the proposed standards for the 
Health-General Article of the Maryland Code that applied to all 
other types of decision makers. The standards included respecting 
the choice of the patient, discerning that choice through substituted 
judgment, and if these were unavailing, permitting a decision serving 
the defined best interest of the patient. Both the Senate and the 
House adopted the Conference Committee approach to guardianship 
with a problematical amendment to be discussed later in this Article. 
Two other significant secondary differences involved topics that 
the Conference Committee had concluded required further study and 
independent bills. The first was the "end-stage condition n previously 
discussed. The second was the esoteric area of how to deal with 
persons in an outpatient setting: For example, those who are in "No-
coden or "Do-Not-Resuscitaten status, but are being transported by 
emergency medical technicians from one facility to another when the 
need for resuscitation arises. A similar problem arises when emer-
gency medical personnel respond to a 911 call from a person who 
has executed an advance directive which delineates the extent of life-
sustaining treatment to give under certain circumstances. How should 
these technicians respond? The legislature agreed with the Westmins-
ter Committee proposal to address this concern by reference to 
protocols to be later developed by the Maryland Institute for Emer-
gency Medical Services Systems in conjunction with the State Board 
of Physician Quality Assurance. 
Furthermore, there was a significant difference of opinion on a 
question that both the Attorney General and the Mack court hesitated 
to answer in the absence of legislative guidance: Should life sustaining 
treatment be withdrawn or withheld on a best interest basis from a 
73. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-611(e)(l) (1994). 
74. The intention of the Westminster Committee drafters on this issue was never 
clarified, apparently because of some communication problem in the drafting 
process. The guardianship standards in the Conference Committee Bill had been 
specifically endorsed by the full Conference of Circuit Judges on November 16, 
1992. The Conference also endorsed that entire Conference Committee Bill in 
principle. 
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person in a presumably painless and unaware persistent vegetative 
state who has never expressed any preference concerning life support 
care and has not developed a life ethic from which a preference 
could be. discerned? The view of the Conference Committee was that 
to allow a surrogate, agent, or guardian to direct or authorize removal 
of life support in that circumstance would be tantamount to permit-
ting a judgment that it was better for someone to be dead than to 
be permanently unconscious. Although there was sympathy for the 
pathetic plight of such persons,7S there was an equal degree of 
reluctance to establish such a legal precedent. If a third person can 
say that you are better off dead than in an X condition, why not 
equally pathetic Y and Z conditions as well? It might well be argued 
that the legislature, by adopting the Westminster Committee's end-
stage proposal, has agreed to permit a best interest decision as to 
medical conditions Y and Z, and A through X as well. However, 
the end-stage condition is rather' carefully defined to require an 
analysis of all dimensions of the medical syndrome with particular 
attention to its ravaging and irreversible effects on the life of the 
patient, despite therapy. There is no equivalent ravaging consequence 
of the persistent vegetative state per se, despite life support therapy. 
The Westminster Committee believed such a decision could rest 
upon a loosely defined best interest evaluation.76 This belief was 
largely based upon the theory that caring families or close friends 
would be making the decision and could be trusted to properly 
respect the patient's welfare and dignity. The General Assembly 
resolved this dispute by agreeing that the fate of a person in a 
persistent vegetative state could be decided on a best interest analysis, 
but only by the application of the Conference Committee's definition 
of "best interest." In making a "best interest" determination, the 
Conference Committee suggested a balancing of benefits and burdens 
that woud take into account the patient's medical condition and 
personal values. 
75. This writer represented, in private practice, a client who was put in this condition 
by medical malpractice. The family insisted that her life be maintained with all 
available therapy. 
76. The Westminster Bill had no statutory definition of best interest. It included the 
term as a guideline for surrogates who could not determine the wishes of the 
patient and required only that the "surrogate shall consider: ... prognosis; .. . 
risks, benefits, and burdens of any procedure, and alternatives ... ; and .. . 
religious beliefs and basic values of the patient." S.B. 664, 1993 Sess. § 5-605(c) 
(Md. 1993). However, even though the Conference Committee's definition was 
more detailed and gave a stronger patient-oriented focus, it cannot be said that 
anyone is capable of truly defining what is another's best interest. The most one 
can do is try to steer the decision as close as possible towards an objective 
patient-centered medical evaluation. 
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It remains to be seen whether this solution resolved or begged 
the clinical question. It can be safely said, however, that merely 
being in a persistent vegetative state is an insufficient basis, in and 
of itself, for denial of life support. Further, because there is no 
known treatment that would restore consciousness, if a permanent 
persistent vegetative state is diagnosed it may be difficult to ration-
alize that the benefit of continued life is outweighed by the burden 
of life support-typically artificial respiration and tube feeding of 
which the patient is presumably unaware. 77 
Finally, there were two important differences of opinion regard-
ing the role of physicians. The first was whether physicians should 
be given carte blanche to decide in their professional discretion when 
treatment modalities are ineffective and need not be employed, 
regardless of the wishes of the patient or the patient's surrogate, 
agent, or guardian. The Conference Committee urged that "medically 
ineffective" treatment be defined. This position was taken because, 
before enactment of the HCDA, physician judgment was subject at 
least to negligence standards. Because both the Conference Committee 
Bill and the Westminster Committee Bill immunized providers who 
act in good faith 78 in accordance with the HCDA, it was believed 
necessary to give some definition to this critical concept. Both the 
Senate and House agreed.79 By defining "medically ineffective," the 
HCDA reduced the possibility that a physician would resort to that 
justification in order to avoid the patient-protecting best interest 
standards and other safeguards. The second physician related disa-
greement concerned the Conference Committee's recommendation 
that a health care provider should have the right, independent of the 
77. There will presumably be respected opinion to the contrary because one of the 
driving forces of the death with dignity movement has been concern for patients 
whose lives are permanently trapped in an unconscious state, as well as for their 
families. If the intention is to decide that a PVS patient should be allowed to 
die solely by reason of that condition, the General Assembly, the medical 
community, and the public should consider confronting and debating the issue 
directly and honestly. They could do so, first, by accepting the cost of such care 
as a public responsibility and, second, by considering the ethical and public 
policy implications of legislation that would amend the statutory definition of 
death to include this condition. See Veatch, The Impending Col/apse 0/ the 
Whole Brain Definition 0/ Death, 23 Hastings Center Report 18 (1993). 
78. One may be considered to be acting in good faith if there is an honest (subjective) 
belief that his or her actions conform to the law. The focus is on the actor's 
state of mind. Negligence, on the other hand, invokes a more objective analysis-
whether the actor's conduct conforms to a standard of reasonable care, usually 
defined in medical malpractice cases by expert witnesses. It is possible for a 
person to act negligently but in good faith. See State v. Faulkner, 301 Md. 482, 
483 A.2d 759 (1984); MD. CIv. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 4.17(2) (3d. ed. 
1993). 
79. C/. 1993 Md. Laws 372, § 5-601 (n). 
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health care decision maker, to take a disputable life support instruc-
tion to a patient care advisory committee or a court if it is believed 
that the instruction is "inconsistent with generally accepted standards 
of patient care." The legislature agreed and amended the Westminster 
Committee Bill accordingly. so 
In summary, the secondary issues were compromised by the 
adoption of the simplified structureS I of the Hollinger Bill that 
included an amended version of its proposed "end-stage condition," 
a broad advance directive model and outpatient-protocol language. 
Also included in the Bill were these Conference Committee recom-
mendations: (1) standards for surrogates that focus their decisions 
on the patient's needs and wishes; (2) a full preamble to reflect the 
philosophy of the law including the balance struck between personal 
health care autonomy and community respect for life, qua life; (3) 
the living will, amended to include the persistent vegetative state and 
the nourishment by tube option, along with a broader advance 
directive option; (4) clear authority for distinct agent, surrogate, 
guardian, and physician decisions regarding tube nourishment as 
distinguished from other life support modalities; (5) the full guardi-
anship proposal of the Conference of Circuit Judges amended to 
allow a judge to give life support authority in advance in certain 
circumstances; (6) a full and delineated definition of "best interest" 
to focus attention on the patient's medical condition and values to 
preclude decisions made in someone else's best interest; (7) a defi-
nition of "medically ineffective treatment," to limit physician dis-
cretion; (8) authorization of a health care provider to challenge a 
disputed life support instruction; (9) clarification of the emergency 
80. 1993 Md. Laws 372, § 5-612(a). See S.B. 676, 1993 Sess. § 20A-207 (Md. 1993). 
The Westminster Committee Bill did provide that "any person" (later restricted 
by legislative amendment to family members and others who would qualify as 
surrogates) could go to court to contest an alleged unlawful instruction. Both 
the Westminster Committee Bill and the Conference Committee Bill provided 
for the event of disagreement among surrogates, with the Westminster Bill 
referring the matter to a patient care advisory committee. See S.B. 664, 1993 
Sess. § 5-605(b) (Md. 1993). 
81. By "structure," it is meant, for example, whether health care agent, surrogate, 
physician, and guardian decisions are statutorily distinguished; whether a proce-
dural difference, in terms of choice, between tubes supplying food and water 
and all other life sustaining methods should be articulated; whether a distinction 
should be drawn between a patient who is terminally ill and one who is in a 
persistent vegetative state; and whether the difference between the living will and 
the alternative broader advance directive should be maintained. The structure of 
the Westminster Committee Bill did not make these distinctions, preferring to 
fold them into single sections. The consequent brevity in format, the absence of 
certain definitions and standards, the impression that there were fewer restraints 
on decision making, and the inclusion of end-stage condition were decisively 
popular features of the Westminster Bill. 
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treatment law; and (10) some formality, such as requiring two wit-
nesses in the execution of advance directives. 
The compromises regarding the secondary issues and the pre-
existing agreement on the primary and other comparatively minor 
issues facilitated the blending of the Bills. The amended Westminster 
Committee Bill was given a favorable report by the Senate Judicial 
Proceedings Committee. There was spirited debate in the Senate, and 
a series of tightening amendments resulted in a final compromise on 
several remaining controversies, assuring the Bill's passage there. 82 
82. The debate was led by Senator John A. Cade. Among the amendments proposed 
by Senator Christopher McCabe, which were supported by the Maryland Catholic 
Conference (the MCC ultimately supported neither bill, largely because of their 
inclusion of "end-stage"), were: (1) the restoration to the preamble of proposed 
Conference Committee language that the "balance struck by this law furthers 
the preeminent societal value that the life of every individual has worth in and 
of itself"; (2) a clarification of potentially inconsistent language in the use of 
the terms "medical probability" and "medical certainty"; (3) the substitution of 
the term "life-sustaining" for "life-prolonging"; (4) a significant tightening of 
the end-stage condition definition to include the words "resulted in severe and 
permanent deterioration indicated by incompetency and complete physical de-
pendency; and .... for which, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, 
treatment would be medically ineffective"; (5) a slight tightening of the "best 
interest" definition to assure that the "religious beliefs and basic values of the 
patient" are considered only to the extent they may inform the decision maker 
of the patient's best interest as defined, not as free-standing criteria; and (6) the 
restoration of certain of the original living will language and language precluding 
a surrogate's decision as to life-sustaining procedures being "based, in whole or 
in part, on either a patient's preexisting, long-term mental or physical disability, 
or a patient's economic disadvantage." (This amendment added the latter clause 
and clarified the balance of the recommended committee language.) Another 
McCabe floor amendment to the committee amendments, strongly urged by 
Maryland Right To Life, required the provision of life-sustaining treatment 
pending the transfer of a patient by a health care provider who intends not to 
comply with a treatment decision instruction. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 
5-512 (1994 & Supp. 1994). The General Assembly should be credited for rejecting 
the phobia of some who misconstrued the opinions and suggestions of religious 
representatives as an advancement of religious doctrine. Instead preferring to 
welcome, as did the Conference Committee, all reasonable ideological investments 
in the drafting that served to support the philosophically balanced approach that 
responsible participants sought. The consistent theme of the Maryland Catholic 
Conference was to remind legislators that, as argued by Professor Dworkin, 
"[tlhe most basic responsibility of government, after all, is to protect the interests 
of everyone in the community, particularly· the interests of those who cannot 
protect themselves." RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE's DOMINION, AN ARGUMENT ABOUT 
ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDMDUAL FREEDOM 14 (1993). All of the drafters 
of the HCDA worked from life respecting values and differed only in their 
perception of where the greater assault on life's sanctity lay. Was it in the threat 
of needless and harmful prolongation of lire by demeaning technology; or did it 
lay in the threat of unscrupulous or indifferent life ending decisions? The answer 
is obvious. It is a dual threat, and how we respond will depend not so much 
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The House Environmental Matters Committee reported Delegate 
Hixson's Conference Committee Bill after completely rewriting it to 
reflect both the Westminster format, as amended in the Senate, and 
its own amendments. The two Bills were nearly identical as they 
emerged from their respective houses and the Conference Committee 
and Westminster Committee were in basic accord, except as to the 
proposed "end-stage condition. "83 
Because of the mutual desire of the legislative leadership and all 
of the various contributing authors of the two Bills that a compre-
hensive bill be enacted in the 1993 Session, the blended Bills were 
on this law as on our own individual beliefs about human life. Those beliefs are 
informed by both religious and secular humanitarian ethics. In Dworkin's words, 
[o]ur beliefs about human life are decisive in forming our opinions 
about all life-and-death matters-abortion, suicide, euthanasia, the death 
penalty, and conscientious objection to war. Indeed, their power is even 
greater than this, because our opinions about how and why our own 
lives have intrinsic value influence every major decision we make about 
how we live. 
DWORKIN, supra, at 155. It is interesting to note in this regard that the New 
York State Task Force On Life And The Law includes seven persons from the 
religious community among its 26 members. It is discouraging that certain 
organizations and individuals with influence in this major public policy debate 
attempt to exclude religious thought, because in point of political fact that 
exclusion is impossible and because the attempted exclusion both fuels the fires 
of political discord and diminishes the intellectual content of the debate. See 
STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CuLTURE OF DISBELIEF (1993). As one studies the 
literature of organizations professing to study the ethics of bioethics, there is 
cause to wonder what ethics they are studying. Personal autonomy and dignity 
are important and constitutionally protected health care ethics. Encouragement 
of family involvement in health care decisions is also an ethical goal. The 
Hippocratic Oath and physician discretion are ethically important. Respect for 
popular opinion in a democracy is a valid ethic. So too is protection of vulnerable 
life and the establishment of standards of human conduct that avoid debasement 
of life to serve another person's interests or values. 
For other intelligent perspectives on appropriate ethical reference points, see 
STEVEN A. LEVINSON, MEDICAL DIRECTION IN LONG TERM CARE: A GUIDEBOOK 
FOR THE FuroRE 418-19 (1993) (personal autonomy, respect for persons, informed 
consent and information veracity, confidentiality, fidelity in therapeutic relation-
ships, beneficence and non-maleficence, utility, and justice); Care 0/ the Sick 
and Dying, MARYLAND CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, PASTORAL LETTER, Oct. 14, 1993 
(right to life as a precious gift from God, the immorality of hastening death, 
acceptance of some suffering, the value of health care and maintenance, and a 
willingness to reject useless and disproportionately burdensome treatment). 
83. In the context of inevitable legislative compromise, the Conference Committee 
viewpoint was strategically enhanced by the decision to adopt the Westminster 
Committee Bill structure. The subsequent compromise added important substan-
tive recommendations of the Conference Committee. On the other hand, had 
the Conference Committee Bill structure been adopted, the legislative compromise 
may have been the deletion of substantive provisions with which the Westminster 
Committee disagreed. 
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approved by the Senate and the House of Delegates with relative' 
expedition.84 
III. THE TEXT OF THE HCDA 
This Section is devoted to the language and meaning of the 
HCDA.85 The true meaning of this law will be determined in the 
offices of health care law practitioners, in the corridors and rooms 
of hospitals and nursing homes, by future opinions of the Attorney 
General, and by the courtS.86 There has been helpful commentary by 
knowledgeable experts and opinions of the Attorney General to which. 
reference will be made when appropriate. 87 Also, because some con-
84. These decisive votes occurred on March 29, 1993. A motion by Senator Cade to 
recommit the Bill was defeated 33 to 13. The favorable report of the Committee 
was adopted 31 to 13. His amendments to delete oral directives and the end-
stage condition from the Bill lost 24 to 23 and 28 to 19, respectively. The Senate 
passed Senate Bill 664 (by Senators Hollinger, Boozer, and Boergers) on March 
31, 1993 by a vote of 31 to 14 (2 not voting). The Senate passed House Bill 
1243 (by Delegates Hixson, Teitelbaum, Callas, Campbell, et al.) on April 9, 
1993 by a vote of 32 to 15. The House of Delegates approved Senate Bill 664 
on April 4, 1993 by a vote of 106 to 12 (23 not voting) and approved House 
Bill 1243 on March 31, 1993 by a vote of 110 to 14 (17 not voting). On April 
12, 1993 both the Senate (31 to 14, 2 not voting) and the House of Delegates 
(116 to 15, 10 not voting) adopted the Conference Committee report on Senate 
Bill 664 which conformed it to House Bill 1243, the Bill ultimately signed by 
the Governor. 
85. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN., §§ 5-601 to -618 (1994). Generally, specific 
subsection citations to the HCDA will be omitted in this Article. As discussed 
in the preceding Section, the language of the Act is a composite of the Conference 
Committee Bill, the Westminster Committee Bill, and amendments proposed by 
the Conference Committee, the Westminster Committee, the Maryland Catholic 
Conference, various legislators, the Attorney General, the Office on Aging, and 
Delegate Braun's House subcommittee. 
86. It is the hope of the HCDA authors and the legislature that resort to the courts 
be avoided if possible by increased family responsibility. In addition to the 
potential ambiguity inherent in the simplified bill format recommended by the 
Westminster Committee, there are sociological influences that may militate against 
that ambition. Sociological trends are not encouraging. Although a recent study 
by Dr. Thomas Juster of the University of Michigan for the National Institute 
on Aging suggests that family cohesiveness is strong, the traditional nuclear 
family (married couple with children) has declined from 40070 in the 1970s to 
26% in the 1990s and the size of families composed of five or more persons has 
declined in the same period from 21 % to 10%. See Census Bureau Study, THE 
WASH. POST, June 24,1993, at A21; Gina Kalata, The American Family Revalued, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1993, § 4, at 2. Thus, the number in the family pool 
available and willing to assist in caring decision making has been reduced. Of 
course non-traditional families will continue to play an important and positive 
role but such families tend to be smaller in size and comparatively less stable. 
Complicating the family capacity to deal with the problem is the increasing 
number of family members living in distant locales. 
87. Steven Levenson & Diane E. Hoffmann, New State Law Covers Life-and-Death 
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cepts and terms are drawn from the case law of other states, reference 
to them by the reader will prove useful. Finally, a careful reading 
of a study by Rutgers University Law Professor Norman L. Cantor 
of similar legislation enacted in New Jersey in 199}88 is encouraged 
to temper any expectation that such legislation can answer more than 
the most basic legal questions. Nevertheless, a myriad of interpretive, 
scientific, moral, and ethical riddles remain. 
A. The Preamble 
As noted by the recent Mack decision, a legislative preamble, 
although uncodified, is an important guide to legislative intent. 89 The 
preamble to this legislation recognizes an individual's right to control 
his or her own health care. Additionally, it recognizes the right of 
the state to safeguard this privilege so that decisions made by others 
for an incompetent individual will "advance the interests and wishes" 
of only that individual, whose life "has worth in and of itself."9O 
Decisions, THE SUN (Balt.), May 16, 1993, at lA; Howard Sollins, Legal Issues 
Arising from the Maryland Health Care Decision Act Chapter 372 of the Laws 
of Maryland, MICPEL, June 18, 1993; 78 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. No. 93-019 (June 
1, 1993). The principal author of the Opinion of the Attorney General is Jack 
Schwartz who, along with Professor Hoffmann, Dr. Levenson, and Mr. Sollins 
made major contributions to the substance of the HCDA. See also John P. 
Sarbanes & Lark Schulze, Health Care Decisions Act of 1993, 26 MD. B.J. 6 
(1993). 
88. Norman L. Cantor, Advance Directives and the Pursuit of Death with Dignity: 
New Jersey's New Legislation, 44 RUTGERS L. REv. 335 (1992). 
89. Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188, 210-11, 618 A.2d 744, 755 (1993). 
90. The differences of opinion over the preamble among the various authors of the 
HCDA generally mirrored the substantive differences in approach. The Confer-
ence Committee originally recommended a preamble which made explicit reference 
to, among other purposes of the law, the traditional state interests in preserving 
life, preventing suicide, protecting the integrity of the medical profession, and 
protecting innocent third parties noted by the Mack decision as qualifying personal 
health care control. Mack, 329 Md. at 210 n.7, 618 A.2d at 755 n.7. This was 
objected to because some believed it carried a "pro-life" implication and because 
these state interests might be understood as free-standing standards further 
restricting personal, surrogate, agent, and guardian decision making. In response 
to these objections and because Mack made clear the role of these state interests, 
the explicit reference was deleted as unneeded. A different formulation was 
proposed in S.B. 676, 1993 Sess. (Md. 1993) by the Conference Committee and 
amended into the Westminster Committee Bill. It was well crafted by Jack 
Schwartz to reflect the balanced approach everyone sought. It adopts the essence 
of the majority opinion in Cruzan, that the state has an interest in protecting 
vulnerable life, and the essence of the Brennan dissent in Cruzan, that the state 
has an interest in protecting the right of a citizen to decide. Cj. Cruzan v. 
Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 313 (1990). The preamble to 
the New Jersey law includes an explicit reference to the traditional state interests, 
N.J. REv. STAT. § 26:2H-54(d) (1992), as do, for example, those of Pennsylvania 
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B. Section 5-601. Definitions 
This section of the HCDA defines many of the terms used 
throughout the Act, including advance directive, agent, attending 
physician, declarant, emergency, medical services "do not resuscitate 
order, .. physician, health care practitioner, health care provider, and 
incapable of making an informed decision. 
One of the more controversial terms is "best interest." According 
to section 5-601, treatment is in a patient's best interest when the 
benefits of the treatment outweigh the burdens, taking into account 
various objective patient-centered medical and patient values criteria.91 
One respected commentator has observed that 
read closely, in the case of a decision to withhold or 
withdraw care, the definition [of best interest] does not 
(1992 Pa. Laws Act 24) and Florida (Fla. Code Civil Rights 765-101 et seq. 
Laws 1992, c. 92-199). One commentator concludes that physician-assisted suicide 
is a logical extension of medical self determination but makes the case that it 
should be conditioned on the application of state interests. Note, Physician-
Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die with Assistance, 105 HARv. L. REv. 2021 
(1992). 
91. As noted in Section II of this Article, this was the subject of significant 
disagreement among the drafters. The Westminster Bill contained a laissez laire 
definition of "best interest." Thus, in the view of the Conference Committee, 
the Ethics Committee of the Medical and Chirurgical Faculty of Maryland, and 
ultimately the legislature as well, its meaning would have been determined too 
much in the mind of the beholder. When the absence of a definition was 
combined with strong surrogate and agent powers, along with the end-stage 
condition and the immunization of good faith actions taken pursuant to this 
law, there was a real possibility of active euthanasia decisions, or worse. The 
contrary view would have been that caring families and physicians would consider 
these "best interest" criteria instinctively and that no definition was necessary. 
Further, anyone with malevolent or indifferent intent could have translated these 
criteria subjectively. The decision to include a defined "best interest" standard 
is fairly considered as a legislative decision that special care should be taken in 
best interest decisions to protect incompetent and vulnerable patients. It also 
should be of significant assistance to surrogates, agents, and guardians who are 
often in a serious emotional and ethical quandary over life-sustaining decisions. 
The criteria include: effect of the treatment; degree of pain or discomfort; 
consequent "extreme humiliation and dependency" and impairment of the pa-
tient's "dignity"; life expectancy; prognosis; risks and benefits; and to the extent 
they assist in determining the best interest, religious beliefs and basic values. It 
can be fairly assumed that in many cases these "pros and cons" will not resolve 
the question and that it will come down to a de facto decision whether continued 
life is a greater benefit or burden. In these close questions, absent clear, legally 
acceptable direction from the patient, the decision should not be by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, and the tradition of our law respecting life preservation 
should prevail. 
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require an affirmative finding that the withholding or with-
drawal of a treatment is in the patient's best interest. Rather 
if a proposed or existing treatment is not in the best interest, 
the Act permits that treatment to be withheld or withdrawn. 
In this respect, the evaluation is of particular treatments, 
not whether it is in an individual's best interest to be allowed 
to die. 92 
35 
Several medical states and conditions are defined by the Act. 
One such c;ondition is the "persistent vegetative state," which the 
Act terms as 
a condition caused by injury. disease, or illness: (1) in which 
a patient has suffered a loss of consciousness, exhibiting no 
behavioral evidence of self-awareness or awareness of sur-
roundings in a learned manner other than reflex activity of 
muscles and nerves for low level conditioned response; and 
(2) from which, after the passage of a medically appropriate 
period of time, it can be determined, to a reasonable degree 
of medical certainty, that there can be no recovery.93 
92. Howard Sollins, Legal Issues Arising jrom the Maryland Health Care Decisions 
Act Chapter 372 oj the Laws oj Maryland, MICPEL, June 18, 1993. 
93. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601(0) (1994 & Supp. 1994). Although it 
was extensively discussed in Mack. Cruzan. Quinlan and other cases of that 
genre, recognition of the persistent vegetative state is new to Maryland statutory 
law. There was universal agreement that it should be included in this law and 
was recommended by both the Conference and Westminster Committees. How-
ever, as an example of what I earlier termed "tertiary" differences, there was 
and is disagreement in the various answers to the question: How long should 
one wait before concluding that the condition is permanent? Justice Brennan's 
dissenting opinion in Cruzan referred to a study which reported that "the longest 
any person has ever been in a persistent vegetative state and recovered was 22 
months." 497 U.S. at 309-10 n.8. Speaking at the November 18, 1992, West-
minster Conference, Thomas E. Finucane, M.D., of the Johns Hopkins Medical 
Institutions commented that twelve months was a frequently referenced standard. 
The Conference Committee included in various drafts twelve, six, and three 
months in ambiguous cases and no fIxed period in unambiguous cases. The 
Westminster Committee proposal contained no reference to a minimum waiting 
period. The argument against a specifIc waiting time is that in the end it is a 
medical decision driven by the nature of the condition, and that stating a time 
may tend to overemphasize an arbitrary calendar criterion over science. The 
argument for a fIxed time is that since the HCDA gives priority to the authority 
of persons other than trained physicians, laypersons deserve some statutory 
guidance. In the end this was compromised by the recited language recommended 
in substance by the author with the intention of emphasizing both medical 
judgment and the importance of waiting in those cases where the condition is 
not obviously permanent, e.g .• catastrophic injury as contrasted with the more 
ambiguous stroke. There is also an intention to avoid facilitating hurried decisions 
to remove life support, not because it is believed the condition is permanent, 
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Another defined medical state is the "terminal condition," that 
is explained as "an incurable condition caused by injury, disease, or 
illnesS' which to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, makes death 
imminent and from which, despite the application of life-sustaining 
procedures, there can be no recovery."94 
By far the most controversial provision in the law is the recog-
nition of an "end-stage condition." End-stage is a newly legislated 
medical condition, separate from persistent vegetative condition and 
short of terminal illness and imminent death. It is characterized by 
an irreversible condition, severe and permanent deterioration, incom-
petency, and complete physical dependency for which treatment 
would be medically ineffective.9s 
but rather to avoid the sometime medically problematic recoveries which might 
leave the patient alive but impaired to some unforeseeable degree. It is arguable 
that a decision solely so motivated would likely violate this law and perhaps 
criminal law as well. 
94. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601(q) (1994 & Supp. 1994). 
95. See id. § 5-601(i). This provision was strongly resisted on the Senate floor. The 
practical consequence of the provision is that a person in this condition may be 
regarded as if terminally ill or in a persistent vegetative condition. It is drafted 
somewhat tightly, but nevertheless will give greater allowance than the former 
law to those who, in the absence of patient instruction, do not believe it is in 
the patient's best interest to wait for the point in time when the person is 
terminally ill to withdraw or withhold life support. The Attorney General has 
addressed this concern already. He has referred to "complete physical depend-
ency" as a "key phrase" and opined that the end-stage of such diseases will 
have arrived only when the patient's physical deficits are such that ·the patient 
is generally unable to perform independently a broad range of activities of daily 
living. According to the Senate Floor Report on House Bill 1243, the Senate's 
intent on insisting on the "complete physical dependency" language was "to 
emphasize that the category of 'end-stage condition' only applies to patients who 
have suffered severe and permanent generalized infirmity from an untreatable 
irreversible condition." The Attorney General concluded that the condition would 
be present when the "patient needs help in all aspects of personal care," and if 
medical treatment would prevent or reduce the patient's deterioration, the con-
dition would not be end-stage. 78 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. No. 93-019 (June I, 
1993). 
The difficulty with such vague concepts as end-stage is illustrated by the 
remarks of a respected physician-ethicist discussing his approach to the HCDA 
in general: 
Well, it gives sort of a general intent. At least for me the new law 
allows you to use more nebulous information than in the past, and use 
it as an intent to use the substituted judgment standard. So even if you 
can't do that it still gives you some clues to the best interest standard, 
which is the lower standard, so that one of the good things, for me, 
about the law is that it gives you a lot of different potential avenues 
to get the desirable medical conclusion. If one of them doesn't work, 
you back up and go down another avenue, and eventually you find 
something. And why I think that's a very important point-I understand 
that there's, to me, two ways to approaching this law and .any other 
law. One is the legalistic approach, and the other is the right way .... 
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as: 
Another important term, "life sustaining procedure," is defined 
any medical procedure, treatment, or intervention that util-
izes mechanical or other artificial means to sustain, restore, 
or supplant a spontaneous vital function; and is of such a 
nature as to afford a patient no reasonable expectation of 
recovery from a terminal condition, persistent vegetative 
state, or end-stage condition . . . including artificially ad-
ministered hydration and nutrition, and cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation. 96 
Being semi-facetious, the legalistic approach says "let's look at how 
your decision making conforms to the law, and then you can get to 
your conclusion." And the way I would prefer to see it used: and 
prefer to see physicians do this, which I think many of them don't out 
of the fear of the consequences, is to say "let's see what the appropriate 
medical condition is and we're dealing with this individual and their 
condition as it relates to the potential for the treatment to do any good, 
and their quality of life, their wishes, etc., and then let's look back up 
and see how we can justify, document, and support that decision based 
on the affirmative avenues within this law." I think that's not to say 
that you have to circumvent the law, but rather, there's a great deal 
of flexibility in what I would call "creative stretching" that's possible 
under this law that's covered specifically by the statute that should 
alleviate a lot of this fear factor, of not wanting or being able to make 
a decision because of the fear of the consequences. 
Steven A. Levenson, M.D., Remarks at the University of Maryland School of 
Law's and the Maryland Office of the Attorney General's Law and Health 
Program, Implementing the Maryland Health Care Decisions Act (Sept. 14, 
1993). If one did not know the physician to be very compassionate, dedicated, 
and well versed in the nuances of the genre of law, it would be reasonable to 
interpret these remarks as justifying ethically subjective and result-oriented med-
ical decision making behind the facade of the HCDA. It must be conceded that 
doctors are not the only professionals who rationalize the result they want; but 
it must also be said that if such an approach can be taken by as scrupulous and 
informed a physician as Doctor Levenson, it can also be taken by those with a 
lesser understanding and fewer scruples. The HCDA is neither designed nor 
intended to facilitate subjective, result-oriented decision making, no matter how 
well-intentioned. 
Nevertheless the elements of this definition, particularly "complete depend-
ency," will remain a matter of judgment and discretion, and the legislative 
recognition of this condition unquestionably expands the envelope just short of 
active euthanasia. Interestingly, in its legislative findings, the New Jersey statute 
prohibits active euthanasia (it is unclear whether this is an implicit recognition 
of passive euthanasia) and also permits termination of life-sustaining treatment 
in prescribed circumstances "when the patient has a serious irreversible illness 
or condition, and the likely risks and burdens associated with the medical 
intervention ... may reasonably be judged to outweigh the likely benefits ... 
or ... would be inhumane." New Jersey Advanced Directives for Health Care, 
N.J. REv. STAT. § 26:2H-67(4) (1993). However, that law is designed primarily 
to encourage and honor advanced directives and gives little independent respon-
sibility to surrogates. 
96. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601(m) (1994 & Supp. 1994). A significant 
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It applies only in cases of terminal illness, persistent vegetative states, 
and end-stage conditions. 
Section 5-601 also defines "medically ineffective treatment"-
"to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, a medical procedure 
will not: (1) prevent or reduce the deterioration of the health of an 
individual; or (2) prevent the impending death of an individual. "97 
C. Section 5-602. Advance Directives 
Any competent individual98 may make a written or oral directive 
appointing an agent to make health care decisions for the individual. 99 
The directive will be effective when the person is declared 
incompetentlOO-sometimes referred to as "springing" -unless it pro-
vides for earlier effectiveness. Procedural safeguards as to signatures 
and witnesses are provided. 101 If an agent is appointed "under this 
subtitle," that agent has priority over all other decision makers. lo2 It 
is the duty of the patient to notify the agent and to tell the "attending 
physician"103 of the existence of an advance directive. It is the duty 
interpretive problem with this definition was the subject of a May 3, 1994 opinion 
of the Attorney General. The opinion also offers important guidance regarding 
the authority of various decision makers to approve "Do Not Resuscitate" (DNR 
or "no code") orders. 79 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. No. 94-023 (May 3, 1994). 
Excerpts of this important opinion are found in Appendix A. 
97. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601(n) (1994 & Supp. 1994). 
98. A competent person under the Act is at least 18 years of age or who, under § 
20-102(a) of the Health-General Article, has the same capacity as an adult to 
consent to medical treatment and who has not been determined to be incapable 
of making an informed decision. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-601(0, 
20-102(a) (1994 & Supp. 1994). Although the language of the § 5-603 forms 
include an affirmation of emotional and mental competency of the declarant, 
this is not an ingredient of the quoted definition of "competent individual." Id. 
§ 5-601(h). Presumably this subjective affirmation is rebuttable, as is the com-
petency of a person who is simply "at least 18 years of age" and is not covered 
by § 20-102(a). 
99. Id. § 5-602(a). 
100. See id. § 5-602(e). 
101. Id. § 5-602(c). 
102. Id. § 5-602(b)(3). "Although the Act does not expressly state this, one might 
presume that among all individuals with authority to make decisions on behalf 
. of an incapacitated individual, an agent has paramount authority over all except 
a guardian." Howard Sollins, Legal Issues Arising from the Maryland Health 
Care Decisions Act Chapter 372 of the Laws of Maryland, MICPEL, June 18, 
1993, at 5. Presumably a guardian would be required only if an agent is 
unavailable or acting contrary to the welfare of the ward. Sollins also comments: 
"Attorneys often advise clients wishing to name more than one candidate for 
appointment. There is no barrier to multiple individuals being named as agent, 
each of whom has independent authority to act." Id. at 7. 
103. The first health care provider contact of the conscious chronic care patient is as 
likely to be with the admitting institutional provider as with an attending 
physician, and it is at that point that discussion regarding declarations initially 
occurs. However, the attending physician would normally be informed by the 
admitting information if not by the patient. 
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of the attending physician to record that existence. An agent is to 
follow the instructions of the declarant in an event covered by those 
instructions. Otherwise, an agent is guided by the same standards 
governing surrogate decisions. 104 An owner, operator, or employee 
of a health care facilitylOS may not be an agent unless also qualified 
as a surrogate.106 
Oral advance directives, witnessed and documented in the med-
ical record, are also permitted as a means of making life-sustaining 
health care decisions, including the appointment of an agent. 107 
104. Although the reference in the text of the HCDA is to § 5-606(c), that section 
does not exist. The reference should have been to § 5-605(c): "Surrogate Decision 
Making." See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-605(c), 5-606(c) (1994 & 
Supp. 1994). 
105. Although the word "facility" is not defined here, it is defined for the purposes 
of § 5-615 as in § 19-101. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 19-101 (1994 & 
Supp. 1994). It is highly likely that the § 19-101 definition will be applied here 
as well. That definition generally includes hospitals, nursing homes, ambulatory 
surgical facilities, in-patient rehabilitation facilities, home health agencies, and 
hospices. [d. 
106. In one of the few truly trivial pre-enactment disagreements, there were some 
within the Westminster Committee who preferred not to expressly exclude from 
this prohibition religious organizations whose members live in the community 
and are celibate and thus have neither a spouse nor children. It was ultimately 
agreed that such organizations would have members who would qualify as 
surrogates in the absence of other ranking family members; but religious tolerance 
suffered a slight and unnecessary bruise. 
107. As noted, there was an unsuccessful effort on the Senate floor to delete oral 
advance directives. They are allowed, but restricted to authorizing "the providing; 
withholding, or withdrawing of any life-sustaining procedure," whereas an orally 
appointed agent can be authorized "to make [all] health care decisions for the 
individual." Although the text of the HCDA is not entirely clear on the point, 
it is presumed that this restriction was not intended to compromise the funda-
mental right of a patient to orally direct the physician in routine health care, 
that is, one would not need an agent to transmit routine health care decisions 
to her physician. In other words, when is an oral directive also a lawful "advanced 
directive"? Is it only when the instruction concerns life support? 
Section 5-606(b) provides that life-sustaining withdrawal decisions cannot be 
made by a health care provider on "the basis of an advance directive" when 
there is no agent, or on the authority of a surrogate, unless there is certification 
of a terminal, end-stage, or persistent vegetative condition. MD. CODE ANN., 
HEALTH-GEN. § 5-606(b) (1994 & Supp. 1994). It is intended that for the purpose 
of this limitation, an oral directive pursuant to § 5-602(d) having "the same 
effect as a written advance directive," is similarly restricted. [d. § 5-602(d). If 
life support is to be withdrawn on the authority of an advance directive that has 
appointed an agent, that instruction would not be limited to one of the three 
physical conditions. Of course the agent would have to act in accordance with 
the directive if there were particularized instructions. However, if the directive, 
or an agent with unspecified plenary authority, requested withdrawal or with-
holding of life support in circumstances where the patient was not terminally ill, 
not in persistent vegetative state, and not in an end-stage condition, the instruction 
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Finally, the absence of an advance directive "creates no presumption 
as to the patient's intent to consent to or refuse life-sustaining 
procedures." 108 
D. Section 5-603. Suggested Forms 
Two model advance directive forms are presented in the HeDA, 
although individually tailored directives are also permitted. 109 Form 
I is the former "living will," 110 which was originally applicable only 
in the event of imminent death from a terminal illness but not in 
the event of pregnancy. It has been amended to allow advance 
decisions during pregnancy or in a persistent vegetative state. III The 
end-stage condition is not included in this form. 
might border on a request for prohibited euthanasia or mercy killing and could 
also run afoul of "generally accepted standards of medical care," thus triggering 
the challenge provisions of § 5-612. Id. §§ 5-611 (c), 5-612. If such a case is 
referred to a court, it could make the decision, assuming the patient is "disabled" 
and under guardianship, based upon either a substituted judgment or best interest 
basis. If the patient is not disabled, but does have an agent in the circumstance 
described, (that is, not terminally ill, not in a persistent vegetative state, and not 
in an end-stage condition) the court would have to fall back on principles of 
informed consent, constitutional liberty interest, and the traditional state interests 
to the extent any of them would have influence on the decision. See MD. CODE 
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-613 (1994 & Supp. 1994). 
Also, SolIins has commented: "Historically, some hospitals and other health 
care facilities have not honored oral advance directives recorded in the medical 
records of another facility. That practice may be in doubt given the determination 
that an oral directive is as effective as a written one." Howard Sollins, Legal 
Issues Arising from the Maryland Health Care Decisions Act Chapter 372 of the 
Laws of Maryland, MICPEL, June 18, 1993, at 6. 
108. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-602(i) (1994 & Supp. 1994). 
109. Sollins makes pertinent comments regarding potentially confusing language in 
the law, for example, an agent's authority in Part A of Form II to make a life 
support decision "in appropriate circumstances." Since the HCDA requires such 
decisions to conform to the statutory standards, Sollins suggests that this presents 
a question "as to whether the declarant intends that some other or additional 
measure of 'appropriateness' be considered when a life-sustaining procedure is 
at issue." Howard Sollins, Legal Issues Arising from the Maryland Health Care 
Decisions Act Chapter 372 of the Laws of Maryland, MICPEL, June 18, 1993, 
at 8. Potential problems will be avoided by carefully drawn directives. 
110. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-603 (1994 & Supp. 1994). 
111. The attorney general has clarified the pregnancy option language in Form I which 
refers to an "agent." Form I is not intended for the appointment of an agent 
and the model forms which will be distributed to the public will conform the 
language to the obvious legislative intent. See 78 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. No. 93-
019 (June 1, 1993). 
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Form II is designed to accommodate virtually all health care 
decisions, including end-stage conditions, and allows an appointed 
health care agent to make those decisions. 1I2 Both forms present 
important choices in a check-off format. In a recent opinion, the 
Attorney General addressed section 5-603, including Form II's am-
biguous option: "I direct that no matter what my condition., medi-
cation not be given to relieve pain and suffering, if it would shorten 
my remaining life. "113 The opinion concludes that this problematic 
language is intended for patients desiring not to accept pain relieving 
medication that, for example, depresses respiration and thereby in-
112. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-603 (1994 & Supp. 1994). As noted 
earlier, this was one of the disagreements regarding secondary issues. The 
Conference Committee had proposed a durable power of attorney for health 
care decisions and the retention of the living will-without the pregnancy 
exception. It proposed that the living will be amended to include decisions 
concerning artificially provided fluids and nutrients and the persistent vegetative 
condition. It was also recommended that a post-legislative session conference 
of all interested organizations and individuals draft a model general advance 
directive. On the other hand, the Westminster Committee Bill proposed the 
elimination of the living will in favor of a single model advance directive which 
would encompass all possible decisions and the appointment of a health care 
agent. The compromise previously discussed resulted in the availability of both 
forms. Although having two model forms might be slightly more cumbersome, 
it is an objective of this legislation to encourage advance directives and therefore 
both alternatives should be available. 
It is expected that the HCDA combined with the federal Patient Self-
Determination Act, Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-508, §§ 4206, 4751, 104 Stat. 1388-115 to 1388-117, 1388-204 to 1388-206 
(1990), will encourage greater use of advance directives. There is evidence, 
however, that no matter what the state of knowledge is about such documents, 
not many people have executed them. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't 
of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 289 n.l, 323 n.21 (1990). This author attended a 
conference of senior citizens in the spring of 1993 attended by approximately 
125 persons, of whom only approximately 5 had executed a living will. Informal 
surveys by this writer of advocates of advance directives for others have 
revealed a notable lack of personal investment in the process. This should not 
be surprising. Advance directives require a person to not only confront their 
own death but also either make decisions about future events which cannot be 
well defined for them at the moment they sign, or surrender their own autonomy 
in futuro. Additionally, many may fear that signing will mean less, not more 
care. Another reason for this historic lack of enthusiasm might be the expec-
tation that trusted physicians and family members will make the appropriate 
decision for them. To this can be added that in many more cases than in the 
past this law will give physicians greater leeway, without fear of malpractice 
retaliation, in discontinuing what they deem to be ineffective medical care. 
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-611 (1994 & Supp. 1994). Because approx-
imately 80070 of deaths occur in an institutional setting, Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 
302, this latter aspect of the HCDA may have greater real influence on the 
duration of life-sustaining therapy than advance directives. 
lB. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-603 (1994 & Supp. 1994). 
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creases the risk of an earlier death.1I4 If this option is not selected, 
"pain relief in accordance with customary medical practice" will be 
provided. liS 
E. Section 5-604. Revocation of an Advance Directive 
An advance directive may be revoked at any time "by a signed 
and dated writing, by physical cancellation or destruction, by an oral 
statement to a health care practitioner or by the execution of a 
subsequent directive. "116 To the extent it is reasonable to do so, it 
is the duty of the declarant to tell everyone who has a copy of his 
or her declaration of any revocation.1I7 
F. Section 5-605. Surrogate Decision Making 
A hierarchy of available family members and close friends are 
authorized to make health care decisions for someone who is "cer-
tified to be incapable of making an informed decision and who has 
not appointed a health care agent." 118 Disputes among surrogates of 
114. 78 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. No. 93-019 (June 1, 1993). 
115. Id. A related question is whether pain medication dosage can be increased with 
the intention of relieving pain but also with knowledge that it will hasten death. 
The implicit answer is, yes. Earlier drafts of this legislation made this explicit, 
but it was decided that this was unnecessary. 
116. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-604 (1994). 
117. Id. It is likely that these necessarily liberal revocation options will be trouble-
spots in the future. The genesis of advance declarations is the traditional last 
will and testament, from which was derived the living will, and onto which 
was grafted what is typically known as the "durable power of (health care) 
attorney." Health care declarations are o~)Viously unlike property dispositions. 
One can be somewhat more objective and emotionally detached in property 
dispersal. Life and death decisions stir the emotions. Consequently, we can 
expect some confusing and mixed signals from declarants, particularly in the 
form of what might constitute partial revocations, about which the law is 
silent. The most intelligent approach would be to benignly accept partial 
revocations and give effect to the latest as repealing or revoking the earlier 
only to the extent of particular conflict. It should also be noted that the HCDA 
gives the highest priority to the expressed preferences of the patient, regardless 
of advance directives. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-611(e)(2) (1994 & 
Supp. 1994). Unless one reads intO' this "competently" expressed preferences, 
this priority may come under stress when a patient lacking full intellectual 
capacity, but who is not legally incompetent, contradicts a directive earlier 
given while fully competent. See Sanford H. Kadish, Letting People Die: Legal 
and Moral Reflections, 80 CAL. L. REv. -857,870-78 (1992). Additionally, there 
is no requirement that there be only one agent. See generally Howard Sollins, 
Legal Issues Arising from the Maryland Health Care Decisions Act Chapter 
372 of the Laws of Maryland, MICPEL, June 18, 1993, at 7, 9-10. 
118. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. 1994). There is 
not yet any constitutional principle requiring recognition of family or other 
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equal rank concerning a patient in a hospital or related institution 
are to be considered by the patient care advisory committee.1I9 The 
physician may follow the advice of the committee or transfer the 
patient from her care in accordance with section 5-613.120 Surrogates 
surrogate decision making. Although medical decisions have been routinely 
authorized by family members, definitive legal authority for these decisions 
have been lacking in cases other than minor dependents, guardianships, and 
emergency treatment. Physicians typically consult with available family members 
for humanitarian reasons as well as to minimize exposure to medical malpractice 
allegations in the future. The HCDA institutionalizes surrogate decision making 
by family and close friends. This policy decision has the great potential 
advantage of granting control to the family, who presumably knows the patient 
far better than the medical staff. In some cases, however, it also carries the 
potential disadvantage of favoring lay, uninformed, and disinterested decision 
making over professional medical judgment. 
As will be seen, the law gives physicians recourse in the event of certain 
conflicts between their own and surrogate judgment. See id. § 5-611 (permitting 
the withholding or withdrawal of medically ineffective and ethically inappro-
priate treatment); id. § 5-612 (providing for referral to patient advisory com-
mittee or court if the conflict concerns life-sustaining treatment); id. § 5-613 
(permitting provider to transfer the patient to another provider). These fail-
safes will be sometimes awkward in practice and the extent to which physicians 
utilize them will depend in part on their individual ethics. In contrast, New 
Jersey's law gives little statutory authority to surrogates. See New Jersey 
Advance Directives for Health Care, N.J. REv. STAT. § 26:2H-61 (1993). In 
that State, if an advance directive is ambiguous, the attending physician, "in 
consultation with a legally appointed guardian, if any, famiiy members, or 
others acting on the patient's behalf, shall exercise reasonable judgment to 
effectuate the wishes of the patient, giving full weight to the terms, intent, 
and spirit of the instruction directive." Id. 
119. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1994). Patient 
care advisory committees are required in hospitals and related institutions. Id. 
§ 19-371. One of their purposes is to "offer advice in cases involving individuals 
with life-threatening conditions." Id. § 19-373. There was some hesitation in 
conferring this semi-arbitration responsibility to these committees, as they were 
not originally intended to have adjudicatory authority, and also because their 
composition in some facilities may be fluid and transitory. Moreover, it cannot 
be assumed that all members will be available in full array at every given 
moment of need. However, it was concluded that if strangers must make health 
care decisions, the comparative simplicity of the patient care advisory committee 
was preferable to the potential complexity of a court proceeding. If the decision 
involves life-sustaining treatment, but not in a hospital or related institution, 
there must be unanimity within the surrogate class before a physician can act. 
Id. § 5-605(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 1994). By resorting to a patient care advisory 
committee, the physician has certain immunity if he or she acts in accordance 
with its recommendation. Id. § 5-601(b)(I); accord id. § 5-609. By negative 
implication, if an action is taken contrary to the recommendation there may 
be liability for a claim based on lack of consent or authorization. 
120. See id. § 5-605(b)(I). By following the advice of the committee, a physician 
receives some immunity for that decision. Id. 
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are to base their decisions on the wishes of the patient and, if the 
wishes of the patient are unknown or unclear, on the patient's best 
interest. 12I Standards for those determinations are recited,122 however, 
121. Id. § 5-605(c)(l). 
122. Section 5-605(c)(2) provides as follows: 
In determining the wishes of the patient, a surrogate shall consider 
the patient's: 
(i) Current diagnosis and prognosis with and without the treatment 
at issue; 
(ii) Expressed preferences regarding the provision of, or the 
withholding, or withdrawal or, the specific treatment at issue or of 
similar treatments; 
(iii) Relevant religious and moral beliefs and personal values; 
(iv) Behavior, attitudes, and past conduct with respect to the 
treatment at issue and medical treatment generally; 
(v) Reactions to the provision of, or the withholding or withdrawal 
of, a similar treatment for another individual; and 
(vi) Expressed concerns about the effect on the family or intimate 
friends of the patient if a treatment were provided, withheld, or 
withdrawn. 
Id. § 5-605(c)(2). 
The substituted judgment standards were drawn in part from Brophy v. 
New England Sinai Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986), and In re Jobes, 529 
A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987). The Mack court also explored the substituted judgment 
standards. See Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188, 618 A.2d 744 (1993). The 
Westminster Committee Bill originally had no surrogate standards beyond the 
wishes and values of the patient. The Bill did have guidelines which were 
discretionary reference points. The intent was to limit surrogate decision making 
as little as possible. The Conference Committee believed, and the legislature 
agreed, that since surrogate decisions are substituted judgments, it was impor-
tant to codify required surrogate considerations. This obligates the surrogate 
to focus on the patient's medical circumstances, prior expressions regarding 
life-sustaining treatment, personal, religious, and moral values, previous rele-
vant behaviors, and the patient's expressed and related concerns about the 
effect of treatment on family and intimate friends. See MD. CODE ANN., 
HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(c)(2) (1994 & Supp. 1994); see also Mack, 329 Md. at 
215. 618 A.2d at 758 (citing Jobes, 529 A.2d at 445). 
This last standard is potentially troublesome. The intention is to recognize 
these concerns among the many pieces of evidentiary history that might better 
inform substituted judgment. It does not permit the surrogate to independently 
consider the impact of a health care decision on the family of the patient, but 
only evidences that the patient has expressed herself about such a consequence 
of the medical decision. On the one hand, a patient may have said that she 
did not want her estate devoured by expensive and speculative medical treat-
ments, or that she did not want to be a burden to her family by a prolonged 
dying process. On the other hand, she may have expressed a strong desire to 
try everything in order to maintain the family income or its stability. Isolated 
statements made under medical stress mayor may not be discounted, but in 
any event should be considered only as a piece of the evidentiary puzzle. No 
one piece of the variety allowed by these standards should suffice for substituted 
judgment; all should be considered. As noted in Mack, "because the right is 
one of 'self-determination, the inquiry focuses on whether the ward had deter-
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consideration of a "patient's preexisting, long term mental or physical. 
disability, or a patient's economic disadvantage" is prohibited if the 
decision involves life-sustaining treatment. 123 A surrogate is required 
to "inform the patient, to the extent possible," of what is happen-
ing.l24 Finally, a surrogate "may not authorize: (1) sterilization; or 
(2) treatment for a mental disorder." 125 
G. Section 5-606. Certification by Physicians 
A patient's incapacity to make a personal decision must be 
certified by two physicians within two hours after an examination. 
Only one physician is necessary if the patient is unable to commu-
nicate. 126 If no health care agent has been appointed, life-sustaining 
treatment may not be denied on the authority of an advance directive 
without an agent or on the authority of a surrogate, unless there is 
also certification by two physicians of terminal illness, end-stage 
condition, or persistent vegetative state. 127 This certification must 
include the opinion of a specialist in cognitive functioning. 128 
H. Section 5-607. Treatment Without Consent 
Emergency life saving treatment may be provided without con-
sent if a person authorized to consent is not immediately available. 129 
/. Section 5-608. Authorization to Follow Emergency Medical 
Services "Do Not Resuscitate Order" in the Outpatient Setting 
Life-sustaining decisions by certified emergency medical services 
personnel in an outpatient setting-for example, responding to a 911 
call or transporting patients from one facility to another-will be 
governed by "protocols established by the Maryland Institute For 
Emergency Medical Services Systems, in conjunction with the State 
mined, or would determine, that treatment should be withdrawn under the 
circumstances of the case." Mack, 329 Md. at 215, 618 A.2d at 757. 
123. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(c)(3) (1994 & Supp. 1994). 
124. [d. § 5-605(c)(4). This requirement may pose difficulties in the case of a patient 
with whom it is intellectually possible to communicate a decision, but who 
may wish not to be told or who may suffer emotionally or physically if told. 
Common sense will have to dictate here; but common sense informed by the 
essential purpose of this law, self-determination. 
125. Id. § 5-605(d). 
126. Id. § 5-606(a). 
127. [d. § 5-606(b)(1). 
128. [d. § 5-606(b)(2). 
129. [d. § 5-607. This provision is substantially the same as the former § 20-107 of 
the Health-General Code which was repealed by the HCDA. See id. § 20-107 
(1990) (repealed 1993). Health-General § 20-107 implicitly recognized the validity 
of a durable power of attorney for health care executed pursuant to § 13-601 
of the Estates and Trusts Article and explicitly authorized substituted judgments 
by specified family members in emergency situations. See 73 Op. Att'y Gen. 
Md. 162 (1988). 
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Board of Physician Quality Assurance." 130 These protocols require 
that "do not resuscitate" orders be followed. 13I Whatever the pro-
tocol, however, a wish of the patient to be resuscitated, expressed 
to those personnel, must be honored; comfort, care, and pain relief 
must be provided in all events. 132 
1. Section 5-609. Immunity from Liability; Burden of Proof; 
Presumption 
Health care providers, health care agents, and surrogates are 
immunized from civil liability and criminal prosecution if they act in 
good faith in accordance with this law.133 There is a presumption 
that advance directives are voluntarily executed by competent indi-
viduals and that lawful decisions regarding life-sustaining procedures 
are made in good faith.134 
130. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-608(a) (1994 & Supp. 1994). 
131. Id. 
132. Id. This section of HCDA was requested by the Maryland Institute for 
Emergency Medical Services. Letter from George P. Smith, Director, State 
Office of Commercial Ambulance Licensing and Regulation for the Maryland 
Institute for Emergency Medical Services Systems, to the Honorable John 
Carroll Byrnes, Judge for the Circuit Court of Baltimore City (Feb. 8, 1993) 
(on file with author). It is traceable as well to H.B. 1602, 1993 Sess. (1993), 
proposed by the Medical Chirurgical Society. Memorandum from the Medical 
and Chirurgical Faculty of Maryland, The Committee on Professional Ethics 
to Jose Martinez, M.D., Chair, Legislative Committee (Feb. 3, 1993) (on file 
with author). Other than .in some hospice situations, it was the practice of 
emergency medical personnel to administer life-sustaining treatment, particularly 
CPR, despite some contrary medical order or advance declaration. Letter from 
Smith, supra. The Conference Committee originally thought the inclusion of 
this provision to be problematic because it has the effect of delegating legislative 
authority over the subject matter of this law (in the limited context of emergency 
medical services) to an administrative agency without substantive standards. 
On the other hand, it can be said that the ultimate regulations are likely to be 
guided by the legislative intent of this law and should be subject to COMAR 
administrative publication and comment. Further, at least there are some 
minimum standards requiring that the expressed wish of the patient be honored, 
see MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-608(b) (1994 & Supp. 1994), comfort, 
care, and pain relief be continued, see id. § 5-608(a), and that the emergency 
medical technicians act in accordance with the protocol, see id. § 5-608(a), 
(c)(1), or as instructed by a physician who is either on the scene or is authorized 
to instruct by telephone, see id. § 5-608(c)(2), (3). Considering the number of 
patients who may be in this setting, and the absence of a sufficiently controlled 
medical and emotional environment in which these decisions will. be made, it 
may be useful for the legislature to give future attention to the justification 
and implementation of this section. Cf 78 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. No. 93-019 
(June I, 1993). 
133. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-609 (1994). 
134. Id. § 5-609(d). This immunity has statutory precedent in former § 5-607 of the 
living will law. See id. § 5-607 (1990) (repealed 1993). It was this immunity, 
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K. Section 5-610. Willful Destruction, Concealment, Damage, 
etc., of Declaration or Revocation; Penalties 
47 
This section generally provides that in addition to "any other 
penalties provided by law," any forgery, or falsification of an 
advance directive, or the concealment, cancellation, defacement, 
obliteration, or damage to the advance directive of another, that 
causes the use of life-sustaining procedures against the express wishes 
of the patient, or is intended to cause the denial of life-sustaining 
procedures with the result that death is hastened, is punishable as a 
misdemeanor with a maximum fine of $10,000, or imprisonment not 
exceeding one year, or both. J35 
L. Section 5-611. Medically Ineffective Treatment not Required; 
Mercy Killing or Euthanasia Prohibited; Construction of Subtitle 
Ethically inappropriate and medically ineffective treatment is not 
required of a physician. l36 A decision of medical ineffectiveness must 
be endorsed by a second opinion, unless only one physician is 
available in an emergency room. Furthermore, such a decision must 
be communicated to the patient or the patient's agent or surrogate. 137 
coupled with the relaxation of the traditional life conserving ethic inherent in 
this legislation, that caused the Conference Committee to be interested in 
legislating greater protection of vulnerable patients. Most of those protections 
were enacted. There is particular concern for poor minority populations in 
Baltimore City and elsewhere in Maryland. Poorer citizens do not usually have 
consistent relations with the same physician, relying more often on emergency 
room treatment. It is reported that "blacks are significantly more likely to 
suffer and die from sudden heart failure than whites, and that whites with 
heart disease are far more likely to undergo surgery to correct it than blacks." 
Cheryl Stolberg, Black Heart Patients Found to Get Key Surgery Less, THE 
SUN (Bait.), Aug. 26, 1993, at lAo Also, the poor generally have little access 
to private lawyers, although the Legal Aid Bureau does excellent work in 
providing advice regarding advanced declarations. Although the Legal Aid 
Bureau did not take an official position on the HCDA, several of its attorneys-
Leslie Fried, Eileen Franch, and Joan O'Sullivan-made significant contribu-
tions to the Conference Committee Bill, the Westminster Committee Bill, and 
to the Hixson Bill, which became law. 
135. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-610 (1994). Section 5-610 recognizes degrees 
of culpability, including the possibility of unmitigated homicide. Although that 
extreme situation is very unlikely to occur, it is possible that a close family 
member or close friend may attempt to alter, forge, or conceal a directive 
made lI\uch earlier and forgotten until the critical moment, to reflect a more 
recently expressed view of the patient. The benevolent purpose of such an 
action may negate any criminal intent. 
136. [d. § 5-611(a)-(b) (1994 & Supp. 1994). 
137. [d. § 5-611(b)(2). "Medically ineffective" was intended to cover the myriad of 
circumstances where a physician's medical judgment should be protected. It 
was not intended to be a convenient alternative to the HCDA standards 
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If, however, a failure to honor an instruction to render what might 
governing denial of life support. On October 26, 1994, anecdotal evidence was 
given to the Governor's Health Care Decisions Act Advisory Council (of which 
the writer is a member) that some physicians are certifying that the provision 
of CPR in some cases is medically ineffective. There are several concerns with 
this practice. 
First, the HCDA is, among other things, a carefully constructed set of 
standards governing the circumstances under which life support decisions are 
made. If life support decisions can be lawfully made simply on the basis of 
medical ineffectiveness, those carefully constructed life support standards are 
obviated and a primary purpose of the law is negated. "[l]t is a well-settled 
principle [of statutory construction] that specific terms covering given subject 
matter prevail over general language of the same or another statute which 
might otherwise prove controlling." Perryman v. Suburban Dev. Corp., 33 
Md. App. 589, 598, 365 A.2d 570, 575 (1976). 
The General Assembly was quite particular in detailing when and by whom 
life support can be denied. The Assembly was notably general in recognizing 
the physician's right to declare a potential therapeutic response to be medically 
ineffective. To the extent there is overlap between the two provisions, the 
particularization of LSMT standards must prevail over the generality of medical 
ineffectiveness and therefore a physician is only free to resort to medical 
ineffectiveness in a very limited number of cases. This is the thrust of the 
Attorney General's opinion of May 3, 1994. 79 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. No. 94-
023 (May 3, 1994). 
Second, if such extensive discretion is to be allowed physicians, those who 
have responsibility as health care agents, surrogates, or guardians, not to 
mention the patients themselves, have very little recourse, particularly when 
the decision is made, as presumably it can be, without the necessity of prior 
consultation with agents, guardians, family, or other surrogates. Section 5-611 
(b)(2)(i) requires only that the guardian be informed. 
While the Attorney General clearly advises that in, for example, a guard-
ianship, "the attending physician must inform the patient's guardian because 
the guardian is also a surrogate" and that "the guardian should ordinarily 
inform the court promptly of the attending physician's determination and 
provide a copy of the written certification [of medical ineffectiveness] and the 
physician's order to implement it"; there is no clear procedure in the circuit 
court for this to have any practical effect. [d. In Baltimore City, the practice 
has developed of simply filing the certification of medical ineffectiveness in 
the court file. While this, in a very superficial sense, informs the court, it does 
not truly inform anyone judge who might respond to it. As the Attorney 
General comments in his opinion, 
[d. 
[t]he guardian would be reporting ... an event of potentially great 
significance to the welfare of the ward. The court would then have 
the opportunity to review the situation and decide on an appropriate 
course of action, including, potentially, instructing the guardian to 
invoke the transfer process in HG § 5-613 if the court concludes that 
CPR should be performed but the physician adheres to the view that 
it would be medically ineffective. 
Finally, typically the provision of CPR would prevent an impending death 
by cardiac arrest, even if not by reason of the pathology which has caused the 
hospitalization in the first instance, such as, cancer, infection, pneumonia, or 
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be considered unethical or ineffective treatment would result in death 
during the transfer of a patient occasioned by a disagreement over 
a proposed medical decision,138 that instruction must be followed. 139 
vital organ failure. Therefore, unless life would not be sustained, even if CPR 
were to be employed, CPR would not be properly regarded as medically 
ineffective. The Attorney General posits a situation where cardiac arrest might, 
in some cases, represent "the start of an inexorable dying process that cannot 
be prevented by CPR" and therefore CPR might lawfully be regarded as 
medically ineffective. Id. 
The potential problem with this comment by the Attorney General is that 
it introduces, virtually, a new LSMT standard. The HCDA states clearly that, 
absent some other declaration by the patient, life support can be denied .when 
the patient is terminally ill, is in a persistent vegetative state, or is in an end-
stage condition. There is no provision for "the start of an inexorable dying 
process" as a fourth circumstance. If a patient is not, at the time CPR is 
indicated, in an inexorable dying process and is not terminally ill, nor in a 
persistent vegetative, nor end-stage condition, CPR should be provided if it 
would "prevent the patient's impending [by reason of cardiac arrest] death." 
If the patient is in one of those three states, at the time of cardiac arrest, 
CPR may be withheld pursuant to the pertinent provisions of the HCDA, not 
as medically ineffective. In the language of the Attorney General's opinion, 
if a patient is facing impending death and a treatment [e.g., CPR) 
foreseeably would prevent the patient's impending death, the treatment 
is not medically ineffective as a matter of law. Under these circum-
stances, it does not matter that the treatment will not "prevent or 
reduce the deterioration of the death of the patient." 
Id. at 14. 
13S. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-613 (1994) (providing that a physician 
who disagrees with an instruction of a health care agent or surrogate may 
request that the patient be transferred to another health care provider). 
139. Id. §§ 5-611(a) (1994 & Supp. 1994), 5-613(a)(3) (1994). The drafters of the 
HCDA anticipated conflicts between physicians and surrogates; for example, 
a surrogate seeking maximum available treatment considered ineffective by the 
physician, or conversely, a surrogate demanding what the physician might 
consider in his judgment a premature cessation of life. With regard to the 
expected conflicts, Sollins argues that 
[t]he Act should not reasonably be read to require physicians to act, 
under the exception identified, in an ethically inappropriate way. 
Rather the Act should be read to mean that a physician following the 
Act and continuing to render care, pending transfer, requested by a 
patient or another individual authorized to act in the patient's behalf, 
is not engaging in unethical conduct. 
Howard L. Sollins, Legal Issues Arising from the Maryland Health Care 
Decision Act Chapter 372 of the Laws of Maryland, MICPEL, June IS, 1993. 
The ethics that would be invoked here would likely include a broad range of 
moral, religious, humanitarian, and medical practice precepts or norms. 
The life-sustaining ethic of the medical community is evolving and is 
articulated to some extent by the Committee on Professional Ethics of the 
Medical and Chirurgical Faculty of Maryland (whose chairman, Louis C. 
Breschi, M.D., ably consulted with the Conference Committee and the West-
minster Committee); the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the Amer-
ican Medical Association; religiously based organizations, such as the Maryland 
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Although, "[n]othing in this subtitle may be construed to condone, 
authorize, or approve mercy killing or euthanasia, or to permit any 
Catholic Conference (whose Executive Director, Richard J. Dowling, was active 
in the various drafting discussions); and medical-legal organizations such as 
the Hastings Center and the American Society of Law, Medicine, and Ethics. 
The American Medical Association states: 
The social commitment of the physician is to sustain life and relieve 
suffering. Where the performance of one duty conflicts with the other, 
the preferences of the patient should prevail. If the patient is incom-
petent and did not previously indicate his or her preferences, the 
family or other surrogate decision maker, in concert with the physician, 
must act in the best interest of the patient. 
For humane reasons, with informed consent, a physician may do 
what is medically necessary to alleviate severe pain, or cease or omit 
treatment to permit a terminally ill patient to die when death is 
imminent. However, the physician should not intentionally cause 
death. 
Even if death is not imminent but a patient is beyond doubt 
permanently unconscious, and there are adequate safeguards to con-
firm the accuracy of the diagnosis, it is not unethical to discontinue 
all means of life-prolonging medical treatment. 
The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs for the American Medical Asso-
ciation, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS, 1992, at 14. The 
absence of any explicit reference to conditions such as "end-stage" is notable, 
as is the "beyond doubt" diagnostic standard for the permanently unconscious. 
This opinion also has the physician acting in concert with authorized surrogates 
in determining the best interest of the patient. If this intends a coequal status, 
it may be frustrated by the HCDA, which gives authority only to the surrogate 
or agent. However, in the typical case, they will be acting at least in close 
collaboration, if not in concert. Opinions 2.21 and 2.22 of the Code of Medical 
Ethics address advance directives and "Do-Not-Resuscitate" orders. [d. at 15. 
The Medical and Chirurgical Faculty of Maryland "directs itself to situa-
tions of a non-emergency nature where there is doubt about the patient's 
outcome in the near future." MEDICAL & CHIRUROICAL FACULTY OF MARYLAND, 
GUIDELINES CONCERNING TERMINATION OF MEDICAL CARE 58. The guidelines 
advise the physician to document the decisions, and honor informed personal 
or written (e.g., living will) instructions by patients or their authorized repre-
sentatives. [d. If there are disputes, recourse to second opinions and hospital 
ethics committees is encouraged; and if disagreement persists, "it is appropriate 
for the physician to resign from the care of that patient and transfer the care 
to another accepting physician, if possible." [d. at 59. These guidelines contain 
no explicit reference to either the persistent vegetative or "end-stage" condi-
tions; but it is anticipated that they will be supplemented to reflect the enactment 
of the HCDA. The guidelines also appear merely to track the law and give 
procedural advice in the context of the law. The ethic is not as pronounced. 
Appropos, the AMA Code includes the statement: "Ethical standards of 
professional conduct and responsibility may exceed but are never less than, 
nor contrary to, those required by law." The Council on Ethical and Judicial 
Affairs for the American Medical Association, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: 
CURRENT OPlNIONS, 1992, at l. 
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affirmative or deliberate act or omission to end life other than to 
permit the natural process of dying."I40 Reasonable efforts to provide 
food and water without tubes are required. 141 Moreover, when a 
decision to end life-sustaining procedures is to be made by an agent 
or surrogate, nothing precludes a separate decision as to tube feed-
ing}42 Finally, no medical treatment decision, with which the patient 
140. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-611(c) (1994 & Supp. 1994). 
141. Id. § 5-611(d). This was in part a response to the alleged practice of convenience 
intubation, by which patients would be fed artificially, not because they were 
unable to take nutrients and fluids naturally, but because of lack of staff or 
time or patience. This practice is not wrong per se, but in the context of this 
law serious questions were raised that, given the blending of this life-sustaining 
procedure with all other life-sustaining procedures and understanding that no 
other life-sustaining procedure is as likely to be used for convenience, there 
needed to be a requirement that natural feeding be done whenever feasible. 
142. Id. § 5-611(e)(1). The state of the law on this point is that there is no required 
legal distinction between sustaining life by artificial feeding through tubes and 
sustaining life by more commonly recognized devices such as the respirator. In 
Cruzan, the majority opinion concluded, for purposes of that case, "that the 
United States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally 
protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition." Cruzan v. Direc-
tor, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990). The Mack decision 
took up this question only in the context of the 1990 amendment to the Estates 
and Trusts Article § 13-708(b) and (c), which clarified the power of the circuit 
court to authorize a guardian to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment. 
See Act of May 29, 1990, ch. 709, 1990 Md. Laws 2934 (codified as amended 
at MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-708(b), (c) (Supp. 1994». The majority 
opinion concluded that "[a]bsent a statutory exclusion of artificially adminis-
tered sustenance from the medical treatment or procedure referred to in § 13-
708, artificially administered sustenance is included in those terms." Mack v. 
Mack, 329 Md. 188, 214, 618 A.2d 744, 757 (1993). 
The Mack decision cited appellate holdings in nine other states which 
reached the same substantive conclusion. See id. at 213 n.8, 618 A.2d at 756 
n.8. On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Missouri saw a legal distinction. 
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 423-24 (Mo. 1988), aff'd sub nom., 
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); see also 
In re Conroy, 464 A.2d 303,312-14 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984). In light 
of the leeway afforded the states by the Supreme Court in Cruzan, and by the 
implication in Mack that the General Assembly could make a due process or 
other distinction, a higher burden of proof of patient intent could be legislatively 
required before food and water could be withdrawn or withheld. 
Moreover, there are many who see a medical and moral difference. The 
family of Karen Ann Quinlan did not seek removaJ of her feeding tubes. In 
re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 651 (N.J. 1976). The family of Nancy Cruzan did. 
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 265. Presumably, if feeding tubes were removed, as could 
be done in the patient's best interest by a surrogate or an agent, significantly 
before the fatal pathology would have run its natural course, the death 
certificate would likely have to record the primary cause of death as dehydra-
tion. But see McConnell v. Beverly Enters., 553 A.2d 596, 605 (Conn. 1989). 
Opinion in the medical community appears to be divided, as revealed in a 
recent survey of 1400 physicians and nurses, 42070 of whom believed that even 
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is known to disagree, may be implemented. 143 
when other life-sustaining treatment is withdrawn, "food and water should 
always be continued." Doctors, Nurses Troubled over Dying Patients' Care, 
THE SUN (Bait.), Jan. 14, 1993, at A6. A recent CBS 60 Minutes program 
documented a case where artificial feeding was ordered removed from a severely 
disabled patient who was neither terminally ill nor comatose. 60 Minutes (CBS 
television broadcast, Mar. 3, 1994); see also, Wendy A. Kronmiller, Comment, 
A Necessary Compromise: The Right to Forgo Artificial Nutrition and Hydra-
tion Under Maryland's Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, 47 MD. L. REV. 1188 
(1988). 
The Conference Committee recommended that the statutory life-sustaining 
decision tree include a separate branch for tube feeding. The legislature agreed 
in principle but provided only a large twig in § 5-611(e), which makes clear 
that an independent tube feeding decision is still permitted. See MD. CODE 
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-611(e)(I) (1994 & Supp. 1994). The HCDA approach 
may be the best possible solution. In addition to the explicit authority to 
distinguish this form of life support, the suggested advance directive forms in 
§ 5-603 give a declarant the option to request the continuation or discontinu-
ation of artificial feeding, although the language-"the administration of 
nutrition and hydration artificially" -may not be fully understood by an 
untutored declarant at first glance. This clinical language was considered to 
. have less emotional overtone than the plain-speak "food and water," and 
would presumably in any event be translated for proper "informed consent." 
[d. § 5-603. 
143. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-611(e)(2) (1994 & Supp. 1994). In this 
section the delicate ball bearings of the Bill's ethical machinery are found. This 
section states that ethically inappropriate and medically ineffective treatment 
are not required, mercy killing and euthanasia are forbidden, and any deliberate 
action intended to end life is not permitted by this law unless that action is 
intended "to permit the natural process of dying." [d. Of course virtually 
every medical response to a serious trauma or disease, (for example, the 
introduction of antibiotics and tube feeding) to some degree, interferes with 
the natural process of dying; and it is unclear, except perhaps metaphysically, 
how an act intended to end life can be transformed into an act to permit the 
natural process of dying, as the text literally implies. Further, there are 
physicians whose personal ethics might rationalize a decision not to act to save 
the life. Examples of this might be a sincerely held belief that recovery would 
deny the patient a quality of life that he should enjoy, that post-recovery life 
would be a great burden to the patient or to their family, or that the patient 
has already suffered enough. See, e.g., It's Over Debbie, 259 JAMA 272 (1988). 
The intention of this section is to express two important ideas: homicide, 
including euthanasia and mercy killing, is forbidden; but a decision to not act 
to save life is permitted if that decision is based upon a professionally informed 
judgment that treatment would be ineffective to save the life or if a life-
sustaining intervention would contravene some objective ethical norm. In no 
event, however, should a medical ineffectiveness decision circumvent the stan-
dards of the HCDA governing denial of life support. Additionally, § 5-611(e)(2) 
makes clear that no decision, including a decision to not act, is permitted with 
which there is reason to believe the patient disagrees. See MD. CODE ANN., 
HEALTH-GEN. § 5-611(e)(2) (1994 & Supp. 1994). Whether this is qualified in 
a patient transfer setting is unclear. See id. § 5-613(a)(3) (1994). Nevertheless, 
this core philosophy of the law should give strong guidance to respect a 
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M. Section 5-612. Petition by Health Care Provider,' Court 
Action 
S3 
A health care provider who believes that an instruction to 
withhold or withdraw a life-sustaining procedure from an incapaci-
tated patient is inconsistent with generally accepted standards of 
patient care, must take the matter to a patient advisory committee 
or a court. l44 If the matter goes to court, it will be governed by 
sections 13-711 through 13-713 of the Estates and Trusts Article of 
the Annotated Code of Maryland. 14s Various family members and 
certified surrogates may also obtain an injunction against a proposed 
health care action if they can demonstrate to the court by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the action is unlawful. l46 Courts are to 
give priority to such cases. 147 
patient's wishes however reliably expressed, to use ethically and medically 
sound judgment, and, when in doubt, to preserve life. This philosophy was 
succinctly expressed by Judge John F. Fader, II, one of the architects of the 
HCDA structure, speaking at the 1992 Westminster meeting. He stated that, 
"life and the preservation of life is the role of law unless there is some 
manifestation by a person who is competent or, in the alternative, a person 
who is incapacitated who has the same constitutional right, that life-sustaining 
systems should be withdrawn or withheld." Video tape of Westminster Meeting 
(1992) (on file with author). 
144. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-612(a)(l) (1994). This section of the HCDA 
and § 5-611 implement the State's interest in protecting the integrity of the 
healing professions. It is also the principal safety valve for patients who may 
be victimized by abusive or questionable health care decisions made pursuant 
to this Act. For example, a premature decision by a surrogate, agent, or 
guardian to remove a feeding tube if it was the only life-sustaining apparatus 
in place might be challenged pursuant to this "appeal" proceeding. [d. Also 
subject to such a challenge might be a premature conclusion that the persistent 
vegetative state has lasted long enough to permit a certification of permanency, 
or a decision against critical surgery or other medical intervention in an end-
stage case at a point in time when any of its definitional elements (e.g., 
"irreversible condition," "severe and permanent deterioration," or "complete 
physical dependency") are reasonably debatable. Of course, referral to a patient 
advisory committee or a court to some extent begs the question, since a judge 
will have little more legislative guidance on these medically, legally, and morally 
sensitive questions than anyone else. In the long run, what is "appealable" 
will come down to evolving community values and the over-arching philosophy 
of this legislation that the patient's wishes and personal dignity are to be 
respected; but the burden should be on those deciding to end or permit an 
end to a life, rather than on those who would sustain it to its natural end. 
145. [d. § 5-612(a)(2). 
146. [d. § 5-612(b). 
147. [d. § 5-612(c). Most, if not all, circuit courts give priority to these cases. In 
Baltimore City they are placed on the "Fast Track" docket and can be before 
a judge in a matter of days or hours. In Baltimore City there is either a circuit 
or district court judge available on a 24 hour basis. District court judges are 
authorized to entertain, determine, and act upon any applications to the circuit 
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N. Section 5-613. Transfer of Patient by Health Care Provider 
who Refuses to Comply with Advance Directive or Treatment 
Decision 
If a health care provider does not intend to comply with a health 
care instruction, the provider must so state and advise the agent that 
the patient can be transferred to another provider and that the 
transferring provider will offer reasonable transfer assistance. 148 
Treatment must be continued pending the transfer "if a failure to 
comply with the instruction would likely result in the death of the 
individual. "149 However, this section does not authorize "a health 
care provider to provide health care to: (1) A competent individual 
over the objection of that individual; or (2) An individual incapable 
of making an informed decision over the objection of another person 
au~horized by law to consent [to the treatment]." ISO 
court for Baltimore City for relief in connection with the rendering or with-
holding of medical or other emergency treatment which cannot await the 
opening of the next session of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. The Chief 
Judge of the Court of Appeals of Maryland makes this designation annually 
pursuant to his administrative authority. See MD. RULE 1200 (derived from 
section 18(b) of Article IV of Maryland's constitution). Presumably the expe-
dition implied by this required priority has greater relative importance where 
life-sustaining treatment is required than when it is to be denied or withdrawn. 
A telling example of the potential for harm in this context was seen in a 
July 1992 circuit court order granting a guardian permission to withhold 
artificial life-sustaining procedures and to authorize a "Do Not Resuscitate" 
order. In re Adoption/Guardianship, No. 44167 (Md. App., July 20, 1993) 
(unreported opinion). In the words of a per curiam decision of the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland which vacated and remanded the case: "Four 
days after the filing of this motion, the court, without a hearing or even 
waiting for an answer from the patient's court-appointed attorney, entered an 
order granting the motion." Id. at 6. After noting other procedural and 
evidentiary discrepancies in the circuit court record, the appellate court com-
mented: 
These kinds of cases are, in a most fundamental sense, sui generis. 
They not only involve, quite literally, the life or death of another 
human being but, more particularly, call upon the court to determine, 
usually from hearsay evidence, which in any other case might not 
even be admissible, the point at which that person would choose to 
reject the opportunity for continued life. This is, to be sure, a most 
grievous decision-one that cries out for great care, for clarity, for 
the most precise articulation. Regrettably, we do not have that care, 
that clarity, or that articulation here. 
Id. at 11. 
The stated intent of a recently enacted "Family Court" bill is that these 
cases might be assigned to the family division of a circuit court, should one 
be established. See Act of May 11, 1993, ch. 198, 1993 Md. Laws 1452. The 
rationale for this is unclear since the typical guardianship case is characterized 
by the absence of a caring informed family. 
148. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-613(a) (1994) .. 
149. Id. § 5-613(a)(3). 
150. Id. § 5-613(b). Section 5-612 refers to "an instruction to withhold or withdraw 
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O. Section 5-614. Effect of Declaration; Suicide; Insurance; 
Declarations Executed Prior to Effective Date 
Denial of life support pursuant to this law is not suicide. lSI 
Making an advance directive does not affect the sale, procurement, 
or issuance of life insurance policies nor does it modify existing 
policy terms. IS2 Lawful denial of life support does not invalidate such 
a life-sustaining treatment" and requires a petition to a patient advisory 
committee or the court if the instruction "is inconsistent with generally accepted 
standards of medical care." See id. § 5-612(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1994). Section 
5-613 covers all treatment decisions and does not specifically authorize referral 
to the patient advisory committee, although there is nothing to preclude it. See 
id. § 5-613 (1994). When a provider objects to an instruction as "inconsistent 
with generally accepted standards of patient care," which might include not 
just practice standards, but also legal interpretation, ethics, or provider treat-
ment philosophy that provider is to give notice of an intended transfer to 
another provider (which could be another physician or another institution) and 
offer to assist in transferring the patient to where presumably the instruction 
will be honored. [d. § 5-613(a). This section assumes that there would be a 
willing transferee provider prepared to do what the first provider believed to 
be a breach of the standard of care. If there was no such willing transferee, 
the provider would be at a stalemate unless the refusal was based upon ethical 
or medically ineffective grounds. In such an event, the provider, if a physician, 
could simply refuse pursuant to § 5-611. [d. § 5-611(a), (b) (1994 & Supp. 
1994). However, if the objectionable instruction is to not provide treatment, 
and that instruction came from a competent patient or a surrogate, agent, or 
guardian, then the treatment could not be provided. [d. § 5-613(b) (1994). This 
might on occasion put a physician, who believes that not to provide treatment 
is a dimension of treatment and unethical in a particular case, at risk in the 
event of a conflict between §§ 5-611 and 5-613. It should also be noted that 
while § 5-611 gives a physician an ethical and ineffective treatment "out," the 
out apparently does not apply if, while the patient is pending transfer to 
another provider pursuant to § 5-613, a failure to comply would put the patient 
at risk. See id. A complete and clarifying analysis of §§ 5-611, 5-612, and 5-
613 and their inter-relationship is beyond the scope of this Article; but their 
combined intent is to find the balance between the obligation to honor health 
care decisions and the practice standards and ethical obligations of providers 
and physicians, without jeopardizing the life of the patient in the process. 
151. [d. § 5-614(a). A deliberate withholding or withdrawal of life support with the 
intent to cause or permit death which would otherwise not occur would be 
homicide unless the action was taken pursuant to this law. An actor other than 
the patient who withholds or withdraws a life-sustaining procedure may be 
criminally liable for assisted suicide, which may violate Maryland common 
law. See 78 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. No. 93-036 (Sept. 8, 1993); Note, Criminal 
Liability oj Participants in Suicide: State v. Williams, 5 MD. L. REV. 324 
(1941). The intent of this section is nonetheless clear-that a person is not 
committing suicide if, pursuant to this law, he instructs that life support be 
withheld or withdrawn from him. Further, anyone who acts, pursuant to that 
instruction and this law, to cause the withholding or withdrawal of life support 
has immunity from criminal prosecution. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-
609 (1994). 
152. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-614(b)(I) (1994 & Supp. 1994). 
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a poficy.1S3 Also, "[a] person may not be required to make an 
advance directive as a condition for being insured for, or recelVlng, 
health care services. "IS4 Finally. "[a]ny declaration of a patient or 
any designation of an agent made prior to October 1, 1993 shall be 
given full force and effect as provided in this subtitle." ISS 
P. Section 5-615. Provision of Information 
Health care facilities lS6 are required to inform admittees of their 
right to make treatment decisions by advance directives or other-
wise. lS7 
Q. Section 5-616. Preservation of Existing Right; Advance 
Directives Executed Before Effective Date 
Section 5-616 provides that 
[t]he provisions of this subtitle are cumulative with existing 
law regarding an individual's right to consent or refuse to 
153. [d. § 5-614(b)(2). 
154. [d. § 5-614(c). 
155. [d. § 5-614(d). This latter sentence is intended to "grandfather" advance 
declarations and designations of health care agents in durable powers of 
attorney for health care prior to the effective date of this law. There was some 
small shadow of doubt about the validity of these in Maryland absent express 
legislative approval; but the 1988 opinion of the Attorney General, see 73 Op. 
Att'y Gen. Md. 162 (1988), and the Cruzan decision gave health care agents 
at least some federal constitutional support. Also, oral declarations or instruc-
tions to physicians by patients would likewise be "grandfathered." The phrase 
"as provided in this subtitle" is not easily understood literally, as there is 
nothing expressly providing for them elsewhere in the HCDA subtitle (subtitle 
6). A reasonable interpretation is that their employment will be in accordance 
with the standards of this law. For example, the expressed wish of the patient, 
short of mercy killing or euthanasia (including assisted suicide), will be honored; 
in the absence of such expression, the decisional standards for agents would 
apply. 
156. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-615(a) (1994 & Supp. 1994); see id. § 19-
101 (1990 & Supp. 1994) (defining health care facilities). 
157. [d. § 5-615 (1994 & Supp. 1994). The federal Patient Self-Determination Act, 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 4206, 
4751, 104 Stat. 1388-115 to 1388-117, 1388-204 to 1388-206 (1990), became 
effective on December 1, 1991, and requires hospitals, nursing homes, hospices, 
home health agencies, and health maintenance organizations receiving Medicare 
or Medicaid reimbursements to give similar information concerning the law of 
their state, and to give patients a copy of that facility's policy of implementation 
of that law. Additionally, it requires medical record documentation of patient 
instructions and public education of the advance declaration options. [d. 
However, it is uncertain that emergency room arrivals, outpatient clinics, and 
the offices of physicians are covered. The HCDA would plug any holes in this 
informational coverage. 
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consent to medical treatment and do not impair any existing 
rights or responsibilities which a health care provider, a 
patient, including a minor or incompetent patient, or a 
patient's family may have in regard to the provision, with-
holding, or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures under 
the common law or statutes of the State. ISS 
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158. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-616(a) (1994 & Supp. 1994). In addition 
to protecting rights existing as of October 1, 1993, this section assumes the 
common and constitutional law of this state and nation will continue to evolve, 
and to the extent that. such later law expands the rights of citizens beyond 
those in this law, those rights would apply as well. Although it is not likely 
that the United States Congress will legislate beyond the existing Patient Self-
Determination Act, Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-508, §§ 4206, 4751, 104 Stat. 1388-115 to 1388-117, 1388-204 to 1388-206 
(1990), preferring the states to act as the nation's laboratories in this field, it 
is not as likely that the federal courts will follow suit. The Cruzan decision 
was limited in its reach, and the Brennan dissent in that case presents another 
potentially less restrictive approach to these questions. Cruzan v. Director, 
Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 301-30 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
For example, after acknowledging the potential influence of the state interests 
in medical self-determination, Justice Brennan wrote that "the State's general 
interest in life must accede to Nancy Cruzan's particularized and intense interest 
in self-determination in her choice of medical treatment. There is simply nothing 
legitimately within the State's purview to be gained by superseding her deci-
sion." [d. at 314. 
This proposition is not too far removed from the intended routine effect 
of the HCDA in terms of self-determination. Opinions divide, however, on 
the proper answer to the important question of how to assure that a decision 
truly reflects a patient's self-determination, and is not violative of this law and 
the fundamental life-respecting and protective ethic which influenced its enact-
ment. Justice Brennan acknowledged the State's "parens patriae interest in 
providing Nancy Cruzan, now incompetent, with as accurate as possible a 
determination of how she would exercise her rights under these circumstances." 
[d. at 315. He disagreed, however, with Missouri's "heightened evidentiary 
standard" of clear and convincing evidence. See id. at 316-21. A standard that 
was sanctioned by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Mack. See Mack v. 
Mack, 329 Md. 188, 208-09, 618 A.2d 744, 754-55 (1993). The Mack court 
also acknowledged the potential influence of the four traditional state interests. 
[d. at 210 n.7, 618 A.2d at 755 n.7. The formula of the HCDA is to account, 
using the language of the statute, for these state interests by specific provisions 
in order to minimize the need for court resolutions based upon abstract state 
interests. However, the HCDA does not preclude a state's interest analysis in 
extraordinary cases. For example, the language recommended by the Conference 
Committee which was intended to account for the state interest in protecting 
minor dependents was withdrawn, thus giving wider latitude to the application 
of this interest by the State in its parens patriae role. Cf, MD. CODE ANN., 
HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-502, 5-702, 5-1062 (1991); Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. 
Hosp., 293 Md. 685, 447 A.2d 1244 (1982). The law concerning the right of 
parents to make potentially life-ending decisions on behalf of impaired infant 
children is still forming. 
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This section, somewhat redundant of section 5-614(d), "grandfa-
thers" valid living wills and durable powers of attorney executed 
prior to October 1, 1993}59 They are to be "given effect as provided 
in this Article, even if not executed in accordance with the terms of 
this Article. "160 
R. Section 5-617. Reciprocity 
Advance directives and emergency medical services "Do Not 
Resuscitate" orders, if validly executed in accordance with the laws 
of another state or this state, will be honored in Maryland. 161 Such 
orders executed in another state "shall be construed to give effect 
to the patient's wishes to the extent permitted by the laws of 
Maryland. "162 
S. Section 5-618. Short Title 
This new law is formally entitled the "Health Care Decisions 
Act. "163 
T. The Judicial Standards 
As noted earlier, the genesis of the HCDA included the desire 
of Maryland's circuit court judges to have legislated standards for 
judicial life support decisions. These standards were incorporated 
into the HCDA and enacted as amendments to the Estates .and Trust 
Article. 164 
IV. THE ESTATES AND TRUSTS ARTICLE 
A. Section 13-601. Disability, Incompetence, etc., of Principal 
To the extent that a power of attorney contains an advance 
directive appointing a health care agent, it will be governed by the 
HCDA.16s 
159. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-616(b) (1994 & Supp. 1994). 
160. Id. 
161. Id. § 5-617 (1994). 
162. Id. 
163. Id. § 5-618. 
164. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§ 13-601, 13-707, 13-711 to -713 (Supp. 
1994). The enacted standards were those proposed by the Conference Committee 
with one amendment to be discussed below. They govern decisions regarding 
life-sustaining care, including those that come to court in a dispute mode. 
However, some disputed decisions and petitions for appointment of a guardian 
of the person might arrive in court concerning a non-life-sustaining health care 
decision, for example, dental care. The HCDA provides no express standards 
for those decisions because it was assumed that the courts would continue to 
make them on the basis of the ascertainable preferences of the patient and 
expert testimony that evidences the best medical judgment. 
165. Id. § 13-601(d). 
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B. Section 13-701. Persons Entitled to Appointment 
A health care agent appointed by a disabled person in accordance 
with the HCDA is given second priority for appointment as guardian 
of that person, following a person previously designated as guardian 
by the disabled individual. l66 The balance of the existing hierarchy 
(spouse, parents, et seq.) is undisturbed. It also includes a provision 
for a close friend. 167 
C. Section 13-708. Rights, Duties, and Powers "oj Guardian 
Section 13-708 provides that "[t]he court may appoint a guardian 
of the person of a disabled person for the limited purpose of making 
one or more decisions related to the health care of that. person." 168 
The balance of this section continues the language of the former 
law, requiring court authorization of a guardian's consent or approval 
of a medical procedure that "involves a substantial risk to the life 
of a disabled person," or the withdrawing or withholding of that 
procedure. 169 However, subsection (c)(2) is new law, and permits a 
court, "upon such conditions as the court considers appropriate," 
to authorize a guardian to make those decisions in the future without 
further court authorization if the disabled person has executed an 
advance directive containing such authority but not designating a 
health care agent.170 A guardian who is also the disabled person's 
spouse, adult child, parent, or adult brother or sister may be similarly 
authorized. l7l This section subjects "a petition seeking the authori-
zation of a court that a life-sustaining procedure be withheld or 
withdrawn" to a new Part III of section 13-711, "Life-Sustain-
ing Procedures. "172 The new Part III consists of a definitional 
166. [d. § 13-707(a). 
167. [d. 
168. [d. § 13-708(a)(2). This change in the law was recommended by George T. 
Tyler, Esq., who made many useful suggestions in the drafting process, so that 
the law clearly permits a guardian of the person to have only limited authority, 
such as petitioning only for a change of abode, rather than the responsibilities .. 
of a general guardian of the person. Letter from George T. Tyler, Esq., Special 
Study Committee of Maryland Judicial Conference: Withholding or Withdrawal 
of Medical Procedures Involving "Substantial Risk" to the Life of a Disabled 
Person, (Mar. 13, 1992) (on file with author). 
169. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-708(c)(l) (Supp. 1994). 
170. [d. § 13-708(c)(2). 
171. [d. 
172. [d. § 13-708(c)(3). This "advance authorization" language was an amendment 
to the language of the Conference Committee recommended by the Senate and 
House committees. It apparently was the suggestion of the AARP to eliminate, 
in specified circumstances, the necessity of a return trip to the court by the 
guardian when a life support decision is required. It was unclear how the 
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section,173 authority for substituted judgment by the guardian,174 and 
authority for a guardian's best interest decision. 17s 
D. Section 13-711. Definitions 
"Best interest" is again defined to mean "that the benefits to 
the disabled person resulting from a treatment outweigh the burdens 
to the disabled person resulting from that treatment." 176 It takes into 
account various clinically ascertainable conditions, subjectively and 
objectively assessable circumstances such as "pain and discomfort," 
and the "religious beliefs and basic values of the disabled person 
... to the extent these may assist ... in determining best interest." 177 
standards of the law that apply to everyone else pursuant to the HCDA in the 
Health-General Article, or the standards applied to guardians in the new Part 
III, would reach these guardians if they are given advance authorization at a 
time when, presumably, the need for the life support decision was not present. 
It was not the intent of the drafters to allow this species of guardians to float 
freely. The Attorney General has already issued a formal clarifying opinion in 
which he opines that if the guardian is implementing a pre-existing advance 
declaration, the guardian's duty is to fulfill its terms, if possible. 78 Op. Att'y 
Gen. Md. No. 93-019 (June I, 1993). Also, the HCDA regards a guardian as 
a surrogate, and the guardian is therefore "subject to the standards for 
surrogate decision making set out in HG § 5-605(c), whether or not the court 
imposes any conditions." See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(a)(2)(i) 
(1994 & Supp. 1994). 
This advanced authorization amendment is troubling for another reason. 
The majority opinion in Mack, makes clear that it is the judge who is ultimately 
responsible for the welfare of the disabled person, who is a protected ward of 
the court. Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 180, 200-01, 618 A.2d 744, 750-51 (1993). 
Otherwise, why is a guardian of the person typically required? To give someone 
advance authority to make a life or death decision for a ward of the court is 
tantamount to delegating the power of the court, if not abdicating it. The 
intent of this section is nevertheless a reasonable one: When the ward has 
already given clear advance instructions regarding the use of life support in 
given circumstances, or when the guardian of the person is someone who would 
in any event have surrogate authority absent the guardianship, it may be 
sensible for the court, at the time of appointment, to authorize the guardian 
to carry out the terms of that advance directive or to authorize the guardian-
surrogate to exercise her normal surrogate authority when future circumstances 
require it. The judge can keep faith with her responsibility for the ward by 
imposing appropriate conditions on the exercise of this advance authority, for 
example, by requiring the guardian to give the court immediate notice of when, 
why, and how the guardian will exercise the power, and requiring prompt 
medical documentation. 
173. See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-711 (Supp. 1994). 
174. See id. § 13-712. 
175. See id. § 13-713. 
176. [d. § 13-711(b). 
177. [d. Once the policy judgment was made to permit the patient's best interest 
to be a life support decision standard, as opposed to requiring the decision to 
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"Life-sustaining procedure" is defined in Health-General section 
5-601(m).118 Also defined in Estates and Trusts section 13-711 is 
"substituted judgment," which is "a determination by a court that 
a disabled person would, if competent, make the same health care 
decision regarding a life-sustaining procedure taking into account any 
information that may be relevant to the decision," including the 
medical condition, personal and religious values, and a variety of 
behaviors and comments of the disabled that evidences what he or 
she would decide if able to do SO.179 
E. Section 13-712. Substituted Judgment; Evidence 
The court may make a substituted judgment based upon clear 
and convincing evidence. lso Such evidence may include hearsay that 
might be otherwise inadmissible but which is material, probative, 
and the best evidence available. 
F. Section 13-713. Best Interest oj a Disabled Person 
If the court cannot make a substituted judgment, it may decide, 
based upon clear and convincing evidence, what is in the best interest 
of the disabled individual, without regard for the patient's preexisting, 
long-term mental or physical disability, or economic disadvantage. lSI 
reflect only the decision that the patient himself has made, or would make 
(substituted judgment), the legislature agreed with the Conference Committee 
that it was logical to make the definition of "best interest" in the Estates and 
Trusts Article consistent with that in Health-General § 5-601 (e). Moreover, in 
a guardianship there is often no supportive and caring family willing and able 
to assume responsibility for the health care decisions of the ward. This will be 
accentuated in the future since the HCDA strengthens family authority without 
the need for court approval and guardianship will therefore be, predominately, 
the no-family option. There is, in other words, an even greater need for 
definition here, so that decisions by people who will frequently be complete 
strangers to the patient-ward will be discouraged from making decisions based 
on factors extraneous to the patient's medical circumstances and values. 
178. Compare MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-711(c) (Supp. 1994) with MD. 
CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-60I(m) (1994 & Supp. 1994). 
179. MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § 13-711(d) (Supp. 1994). 
180. Clear and convincing evidence is more than a preponderance of the evidence 
and less than evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. It should be "clear" in the 
sense that it is certain, plain to the understanding, and unambiguous. It should 
be "convincing" in the sense that it is so reasonable and persuasive as to cause 
one to believe it. MD. Cry. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 1.8(b) (3d. ed. 
1993). 
181. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-713. By insisting, as recommended by, 
among others, the Maryland Disability Law Center (whose representative, 
Walter McQuie, Esq., served on the Conference Committee), that a best interest 
decision not take into account preexisting long term mental or physical disability 
or economic disadvantage, the legislature erected additional boundaries to" 
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V. THE PUBLIC POLICY INTENT OF THE HCDA 
To demonstrate the philosophical balance of this legislation, this 
Act has given particular attention to its sources-legislators, advocacy 
groups and individuals, bar association specialists, religious and other 
ethicists, academicians, judges, and health care professionals-all of 
whom expressed variations of the important ideas that ultimately 
became this law. The creative tension between the philosophies which 
characterized and gave life to this important law are representative 
of similar bioethical conflicts in every state, in the United States 
Congress, and in the United States Supreme Court. This law would 
not be as useful to the public if one particular viewpoint( prevailed 
over the others. In the end, no one ambition for this legislation 
prevailed. The various factions cooperated more than they warred. 
As a result, a composite of viewpoints formed the public policy of 
Maryland in one of the most important of its expressions-continued 
life or death. 
Although there were reasonable differences in emphasis, there 
was consensus as to the intent of this legislation-to honor both the 
individual's right to make personal health care decisions, free of 
needless court or other intervention, and the community's obligation 
to respect and protect the sanctity of human life. Artificially pro-
longing life which is very near its natural end can be unduly bur-
densome, intrusive, and sometimes painful. It should be discouraged. 
Patients should be free to refuse an artificially prolonged life and 
physicians obliged to honor that refusal. 
Neither the individual's nor the state's interests are absolute. 
Each is relative and might be in conflict with the other. The tension 
will be minimal in most cases because the patient's preference will 
be clear and the medical circumstances, co~mon sense, ethics, and 
humanitarian instincts will support a responsible medical judgment. 
In the smaller number of cases where the medical path is less certain 
and the patient's choice unclear, health care providers and agents, 
family members, lawyers, and judges will be called upon to make 
value judgments in life or death contexts. The HCDA gives strong 
direction in such cases in order that a medically and ethically in-
formed decision which reflects the likely choice of the patient is 
circumscribe best interest considerations and focus the decision on the medical 
judgment that must be made at that time for the benefit of the patient in light 
of the medical syndrome which requires that judgment. Therefore, someone 
with terminal cancer who also suffers from, for example, long-term schizo-
phrenia or paraplegia, is not a more suitable candidate for life support 
discontinuation because of the long term mental affliction or physical handicap. 
The application of this prohibition in an end-stage case will be challenging. 
Similarly, an impoverished person's life has the same intrinsic worth as the life 
of an affluent person. 
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made. In the comparatively few cases where that choice cannot be 
discerned and bodily intrusion, degradation, and suffering is plainly 
disproportionate and violative of the patient's values, the patient's 
best interest will be the standard. Care must be taken to avoid 
subjective "quality of life" or financially driven decisions. Eutha-
nasia, homicide, and mercy killing remain forbidden, and society's 
instinctive respect for impaired life remains paramount. Medical 
decisions that debase life, compromise the integrity of the medical 
professions, or place third parties at unnecessary risk are disfavored. 
This legislation is in concert with the Constitution's assurance of 
"life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" that encompasses both 
control of one's own body and protection of life. The HCDA is 
intended only to extend a peaceful hand to those who want to control 
their own dying process, to give them dignity in their final hours, 
days, or weeks, not to push them into their graves. 
It is hoped that more citizens will think, in advance, of possible 
health care decisions; but even in cases where there is some form of 
advance directive, physicians, agents, guardians, and surrogates will 
be sensitive to the reality that no declarant can predict the exact 
circumstances from which a decision will be required. Thus, to know 
the preference of an incompetent patient at the time of medical 
choice will be frequently difficult and sometimes impossible. The 
same can be said about the large number of cases where there will 
be no formal advance directive and, in some cases, no supportive 
family. It should be assumed, particularly when death is not immi-
nent, that people normally want life-preserving therapy continued 
unless its burden is plainly disproportionate to its benefit in the long 
term. It is expected that the medical community will adhere to its 
ethical canons and its raison d'etre to cure illness, repair wounds, 
alleviate suffering, and sustain life, but not to employ needlessly 
intrusive and obviously futile therapy. It is anticipated that judges, 
lawyers, guardians, health care agents, surrogates, and health care 
professionals will not neglect vulnerable patients because of econom-
ics, mental, emotional, or physical impairment, or because the life 
style of the patient is or might become, from someone else's own 
healthy perspective, less than ideal. Nor will the inconvenience, 
burden, or emotional drain on family and friends be decisive. It is 
not their life that hangs in the balance. All of the authors of this 
law share a basic confidence in the good faith and intelligence of 
the various possible decision makers empowered by it. The authors 
are optimistic that the decision makers will appreciate the heavy 
responsibility of protecting the health and well-being of the person 
in their care, not to hasten the person's death. 
Is there a "slippery slope" danger? Undeniably there is; but the 
grade of the slope depends upon our public policy. By enacting this 
law, the General Assembly concluded that as we descend the hill we 
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do so with great care and a good brake system, and also a good 
steering mechanism to stay on an ethically safe roadbed.l 82 
I close by again drawing upon the thoughts of Professor Dwor-
kin: 
The idea that human life is sacred or inviolable is ... 
central to discussions of [euthanasia] .... 
Three distinct issues come together in decisions about 
euthanasia.· We must be concerned how best to respect the 
patient's autonomy, his best interests, and the intrinsic value 
or sanctity of his life. We can properly understand none of 
these issues, however, or whether they argue for or against 
euthanasia in a given circumstance, until we better under-
stand why some people want to remain biologically alive so 
long as they can, even in appalling circumstances, and why 
others in such straits want to die as soon as possible. Both 
these ambitions will seem unintelligible if we try to under-
stand them as reflecting people's opinions about the relative 
badness of future experiences, for it makes no sense to ask 
whether it feels worse to be permanently unconscious or 
wholly demented or dead. We must ask, instead, about the 
retrospective meaning of death or the diminution of life, 
about how the last stage of life affects its overall character. 
We understand how one life can be more pleasant or en-
joyable or full of achievement than another. But the sug-
gestion that a period of unconsciousness or dementia before 
death might make that life worse as a whole than if death 
had come sooner introduces a very different kind of stan-
dard for judging lives; it judges lives not just by reckoning 
overall sums of pleasure or enjoyment or achievement, but 
more structurally, as we judge a literary work, for example, 
whose bad ending mars what went before. 
[There are] a great number of intense personal convic-
tions about abortion and euthanasia, some of them liberal 
and others conservative. They are honorable convictions, 
and those who have them must live and die in their light. 
But it is unforgivable to ignore the high importance of these 
matters altogether, to choose or counsel abortion out of 
unreflective convenience, or to leave the fate of an uncon-
scious or demented friend to strangers in white coats on the 
ground that what happens to him no longer matters. The 
182. Governor Schaefer, by executive order, established the Health Care Decisions 
Act Advisory Council, consisting of 19 members, to monitor the implementation 
of this Act. Md. Exec. Order No. 01.01.1994.11 (Mar. 29, 1994). 
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greatest insult to the sanctity of life is indifference or laziness 
in the face of its complexity.ls3 
VI. POSTSCRIPT 
65 
Coincidentally with the passage of the HCDA, and largely 
overshadowing it in the media, was the enactment by the Maryland 
General Assembly and proposals to the United States Congress of 
changes in heath care financing. There is little doubt that changes in 
financing will affect availability of health care and eventually a 
rationing-by-triage approach to benefits. Not every therapy would be 
available to every patient in a fully managed system. Historically, 
the discrimination has been largely against those who are uninsured 
or underinsured. In the future, it may be against those who are 
comparatively less likely to gain long term benefit; for example, a 
transplant might be provided to the young, but not to the elderly. 
A new rationing principle may be based on this statement by Hillary 
Rodham Clinton to the Congress: "[No one will be] denied treatment 
for any reason other than it is inappropriate ... [or that it] will not 
enhance or save the quality of life."ls4 
The economic rationing standard today is often unfair, but clear: 
Can you pay? A new rationing standard of appropriateness and 
quality of life enhancement is less clear and perhaps even more 
problematic if it is considered in conjunction with the President's 
own public comment encouraging the use of living wills: "We do 
have a lot of extra costs that most people believe are unnecessary in 
this system, and that's one way to weed some of them OUt."IS5 It is 
uncertain how the traditional living will would put much of a dent 
in the substantial cost of chronic care. They are executed by relatively 
few people and, in Maryland, they are effective only when death is 
imminent or when a patient is in a persistent vegetative state. The 
remarks of President and Mrs. Clintonls6 were not intended as a 
serious pronouncement linking the need for health care cost control 
to living wills, and certainly not to the broader advance directives of 
the HCDA. However, there is undeniably some hint of a possible 
relationship. If one fails to say in advance that they want no 
extraordinary means of life preservation, are they being, in a public 
policy sense, selfish? Will a national health care financing plan 
183. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, Eu-
THANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 26-27, 240 (1993). 
184. John FairhalI, Experts See Rationing Under Health Care Plan, THE SUN (Balt.), 
Oct. 12, 1993, at lA. 
185. Clinton Cites Living Wills, THE SUN (Bait.), Nov. 8, 1993, at SA. 
186. [d.; see also John Fairhall, Experts See Rationing Under Health Care Plan, 
THE SUN (Balt.), Oct. 12, 1993, at lA. 
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provide less for Medicare beneficiaries than for the younger members 
of the population? 187 Given that the percentage of the elderly in our 
population will increase to 21.8% in 2030 from 12.6070 in 1990.188 
how could it not in a fully managed program? 
Dr. Willard Gaylin has expressly linked these issues. He criticized 
the level and content of the debate over the President's proposals: 
What could have been a wide-open. far-ranging public 
debate about the deeper issues of health care-our attitude 
towards life and death. the goals of medicine. the meaning 
of "health." suffering versus survival. who shall live and 
who shall die (and who shall decide)-has been supplanted 
by relatively narrow quibbles over policy. 
The kinds of questions we will need to debate can be 
divided into three: issues of access (how do we decide who 
gets to receive a scarce health resource?). egress (how long 
may they receive it?). and allocation (what medical services 
can the system as a whole provide to everyone?).189 
The HCDA prohibits health care coverage discrimination against 
a person who has not executed an advance directive and it is not 
likely that overt pressure will be brought to bear on those who have 
not done so. The larger risk lies in the cumulative health ethic 
consequence of advance directives. surrogate-agent-guardian "best 
interest end-stage" determinations. and health care rationing which 
allocates less to those who will benefit least. Age and preexisting 
physical and mental conditions and other elements in the quality of 
life formula could become considerations in deciding the appropri-
ateness of a therapy in health care financing and whether it is in a 
patient's best interest pursuant to the HCDA. Whether this is a 
sound life-respecting public policy should be confronted. not evaded. 
and the ethical implications given as much attention as the economic. 
187. This is the fear AARP Chairwoman Judith Brown expressed to Congress. As 
of the fall of 1993, Medicare financed health care for 32 million elderly and 
4 million disabled enrollees at an annual cost of $143 million. Robert Pear, 
Influential Group Says Health Plan Slights the Aged, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 24, 
1993, § I, at I, 18. 
188. Tamara K. Hareven, Aging and Generational Relations: A Historical Perspec-
tive, MARYLAND HUMANITIES, Oct.lNov. 1993. 
189. Willard Gaylin, M.D., Faulty Diagnosis: Why Clinton's Health-Care Plan 
Won't Cure What Ails Us, HARPER'S, Oct. 1993, at 57, 63. 
1993] The Health Care Decisions Act 
APPENDIX A 
EXCERPT FROM 79 OP. ATT'Y GEN. MD. NO. 94-023 
(MAY 3, 1994) 
The Honorable Rosalie S. Abrams 
Director 
Office on Aging 
301 West Preston Street 
Baltimore, Maryland 21201 
Dear Senator Abrams: 
67 
You have requested our opinion on a number of issues related 
to the interpretation of the Health Care Decisions Act, particularly 
as it affects decisions concerning "do not resuscitate" orders. Your 
specific questions, and our responses, are as follows: 
1. Under what circumstances, if any, maya "surrogate decision 
maker" consent to the withholding or withdrawing of a life-sustaining 
procedure or the entry of a "do not resuscitate" (DNR) order on a 
chart of a patient? Must the patient be certified to be in a terminal 
condition, persistent vegetative state, or end-stage condition before 
a life-sustaining procedure may be withheld or withdrawn or before 
the entry of a DNR order can be authorized by the surrogate? 
In general, when the issue presented to a surrogate is whether 
to authorize or decline a life-sustaining procedure that, if 
authorized, would be performed at a predictable time the 
very near future should the patient's condition continue 
along its present course (for example, kidney dialysis), the 
surrogate may decline the life-sustaining procedure on behalf 
of the patient only if the patient has been certified to be in 
a terminal condition, persistent vegetative state, or end-stage 
condition. Although cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) is 
a "life-sustaining procedure" within the meaning of the 
Health Care Decisions Act, the issue posed by a DNR order 
is somewhat different, for such an order speaks to a form 
of treatment, CPR, that would be applied, if at all, only 
after an unpredictable and dramatic change in the patient's 
condition-that is, if the patient were to suffer a cardiac 
arrest. A surrogate may approve the entry of a DNR order 
on behalf of patient. who has not been certified to be in a 
terminal condition, persistent vegetative state, or end-stage 
condition if, but only if, two physicians concur that the 
event of cardiac arrest itself would signify that, at that 
future time, the patient would be in a terminal or end-stage 
condition. 
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2. Under what circumstances, if any, may a guardian consent 
to the withholding or withdrawing of a life-sustaining procedure or 
the entry of DNR order on the chart of a patient? Must the patient 
be certified to be in a terminal condition, persistent vegetative state, 
or end-stage condition before a life-sustaining procedure may be 
withheld or withdrawn or before the entry of a DNR order can be 
authorized by a guardian? 
A guardian of the person of a patient may consent to the 
withholding or withdrawing of a life-sustaining procedure, 
including entry of a DNR order if, but only if, (i) the court 
has approved the decision to forgo the life-sustaining pro-
cedure, including entry of a DNR order, whether or not the 
patient has been certified to be in a terminal condition, 
persistent vegetative state, or end-stage condition; or (ii) 
under circumstances specified by law, the court has author-
ized the guardian in advance to make decisions concerning 
life-sustaining procedures and the patient has been certified 
to be in a terminal condition, persistent vegetative state, or 
end-stage condition. 
3. What is the responsibility of the guardian when the patient's 
attending physician indicates that a life-sustaining procedure should 
be withheld or withdrawn or that a DNR order should be entered 
because such procedure, or any effort to resuscitate the patient, 
would be medically ineffective? What type of documentation is 
necessary under these circumstances by the physician, by the guard-
ian, or by the court? 
A guardian should report to the court that the patient's 
attending physician has determined that CPR or another 
life-sustaining procedure is medically ineffective. This deter-
mination by the attending physician must be certified in 
writing, with the concurrence of a second physician, and 
the guardian should supply the court with a copy of the 
written certification. l90 
4. Does a health care agent have authority to instruct that a 
life-sustaining procedure be withheld or withdrawn from, or that a 
190. At page 16 of this opinion it states: 
The guardian would be reporting, however, an event of potentially 
great significance to the welfare of the ward. The court would then 
have the opportunity to review the situation and decide on an appro-
priate course of action, including, potentially, instructing the guardian 
to invoke the transfer process in HG § 5-613 if the court concludes 
that CPR should be performed but the physician adheres to the view 
that it would be medically ineffective. 
79 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. No. 94-023 at 16 (May 3, 1994) (unbound). 
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DNR order be entered for, a patient who has not been certified to 
be in a terminal condition, persistent vegetative state, or end-stage 
condition? 
If the grant of authority to the agent encompasses decision-
making as to life-sustaining procedures without limitations 
linked to the patient's condition, a health care agent may 
instruct that a life-sustaining procedure be withheld or with-
drawn from, or that a DNR order be entered for, a patient 
without a physicians' certification of the patient's condition. 
If the agent's instruction is inconsistent with generally ac-
cepted standards of patient care, the health care provider 
must bring the matter to the attention of a facility's patient 
care advisory committee or a court. 
5. What is the effect of a patient's advance directive on the 
physician's, surrogate's, or guardian's ability to authorize the with-
holding or withdrawing of a life-sustaining procedure or the entry 
of a DNR order? 
The primary standard for decision-making by surrogates and 
guardians, and health care agents as well, is to make the 
decision about life-sustaining procedures that the patient 
would have wanted to be made under the circumstances. If 
an advance directive affords guidance about the patient's 
wishes, the advance directive must be followed. However, 
a physician has authority independent of any advance di-
rective to determine that a particular life-sustaining proce-
dure, including CPR, would be medically ineffective. 
6. What is the status of DNR orders currently in the medical 
files of patients in related institutions who have not been certified 
to be in a terminal condition, persistent vegetative state, or end-stage 
condition? 
A DNR order for such a patient that was valid prior to the 
effective date of the Health Care Decisions Act remains 
valid. Under prior law, a DNR order was valid for a patient 
who was not already in a terminal condition only if the 
order was entered at the instruction of a competent patient 
after informed consent, with the consent of a properly 
authorized health care agent, including an attorney-in-fact 
under a durable power of attorney for health care; or with 
the consent of the patient's family prior to October 1, 1993, 
in accordance with the standards set out in 73 Opinions oj 
the Attorney General 162, 196-99 (1988), and with a phy-
sician's certification that, in the event the patient suffered 
a cardiac arrest, the patient would then be in a terminal 
70 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 23 
condition. A DNR order entered since the effective date of 
the Act for such a patient is valid under the circumstances 
discussed in this opinion. 
7. May related institutions that handle chronic care cases re-
quire consent to the withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining 
procedures or the entry of a DNR order as a condition of admission 
to the facility? 
No, they may not. 
